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Abstract 
Economic growth is one of the objectives of the current government.  Fiscal 
policy, encompassing government expenditure and taxation decisions, can 
significantly impact on economic growth.  This paper proposes a framework 
which views fiscal policy through three lenses and applies this approach to 
consider how fiscal policy affects economic growth.  The three lenses are: 
fiscal sustainability, fiscal structure and fiscal stabilisation.  The paper reviews 
international literature pertaining to these three lenses and discusses the 
extent to which these lenses are incorporated into New Zealand’s current 
fiscal framework.  Contemporary New Zealand fiscal challenges are discussed 
and, in light of these challenges, the paper concludes with consideration of 
areas to investigate which may yield improvements to the New Zealand fiscal 
framework. 
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Roles of Fiscal Policy in  
New Zealand 
1 Introduction 
This paper has three purposes.  One purpose is to propose a framework which views 
fiscal policy through three lenses and, in particular, considers the ways by which fiscal 
policy can be designed to enhance economic growth.  A second purpose is to explain 
New Zealand’s current fiscal framework and to evaluate the extent to which the framework 
accommodates the various lenses through which fiscal policy is considered in this paper.  
The third purpose of the paper is to highlight and discuss current New  Zealand fiscal 
challenges in order to identify areas to investigate which may yield improvements to the 
fiscal framework.   
Governments have a range of economic and social objectives they endeavour to achieve 
by regulation, the design of institutions and also by the composition or structure of 
government spending and taxation (including the ownership of resources and control of 
service delivery).  While political debates will tend to focus on the preferred set of 
economic and social objectives, economic debate tends to focus on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of policy in contributing to the achievement of these objectives.  The scope 
for discussion on the role of fiscal policy is therefore very broad.  This paper concentrates 
on the contribution of fiscal policy to long-run economic growth.  Our justification is not 
that economic growth considerations necessarily dominate other reasons for fiscal 
decisions, but economic growth tends to be a common objective across governments and 
is an objective of the present New Zealand Government.
1
  Furthermore, economic growth 
provides the base by which governments can finance their social objectives. 
Our analytical framework suggests three lenses through which to view how fiscal policy 
impacts on growth.  These lenses are fiscal sustainability, fiscal structure and fiscal 
stabilisation.  Fiscal sustainability considers the importance of sound public finances and 
stable and predictable taxation rates and expenditure programs for economic growth.   
Fiscal structure considers how the composition of expenditure and taxation and size of 
government impact on growth.  Fiscal stabilisation refers to the role of fiscal policy in 
contributing to macroeconomic stability and growth. 
These considerations influence the way we think about how fiscal policy can be nestled 
within the broader framework for economic policy, including regulatory and 
                                                                  
1  The objective of higher economic growth was explicit in the 2002 Speech from the Throne and is implicit in 
the 2005 Speech from the Throne (Rt. Hon Helen Clark, 2005).  Sustaining economic growth was the 
theme of the 2005 New Zealand Treasury briefing to the incoming Government, (Treasury, 2005a).  
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macroeconomic policy.  They influence, for example, the choice between regulatory and 
fiscal instruments.  They influence how the growth effects of taxation and government 
expenditure should contribute to fiscal policy decisions.  They also influence the extent to 
which fiscal policy can be used for the purpose of macroeconomic stabilisation or whether 
that role should primarily be the domain of monetary policy. 
A key theme which emerges, unsurprisingly, is that fiscal decision-making frameworks 
need to be designed to be robust to political economy considerations and recognise that 
government decision-making will always be in a world of imperfect information and diverse 
motivations.  As James Madison remarked over 200 years ago: 
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern 
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In 
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great 
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and 
in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, 
the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the 
necessity of auxiliary precautions. 
(Madison, 1788) 
Responses New Zealand has taken to strive for fiscal sustainability and an efficient fiscal 
structure, and to improve macroeconomic stability, are divided into those pertaining to the 
fiscal framework (that is, the legislative and institutional framework), those pertaining to 
fiscal policy (that is, those achieved through the setting by government of their fiscal policy 
objectives), and those achieved at the level of fiscal management (that is, through the 
day-to-day operation of fiscal policy according to budget rules or the information and 
advice provided to Ministers). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Sections 2, 3, and 4 discuss fiscal 
sustainability, fiscal structure and fiscal stabilisation respectively.  Each section reviews 
insights from theoretical and empirical research as to how each of these three aspects of 
fiscal policy can impact on economic growth and the challenges of achieving fiscal 
sustainability, good fiscal structure and an appropriate contribution to macroeconomic 
stability.  These three sections then discuss responses New Zealand has made and they 
review outcomes under each role.  Section 5 discusses the connections between each of 
the three roles of fiscal policy and the implications of these connections.  This discussion 
is couched in the context of contemporary New Zealand fiscal challenges. Section 6 
draws together the main conclusions to be taken from the paper.  
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2 Fiscal  Sustainability 
There are several ways to define the sustainability of a government fiscal programme.  
One consideration is political sustainability.  The focus of this paper is financial 
sustainability.  However, political sustainability is likely to create uncertainty and induce 
Ricardian effects in the same was as does financial sustainability, and hence in this 
regard have similar economic implications.  A common approach is to define financial 
sustainability in terms of the feasibility of funding a given expenditure programme under 
the prevailing taxation structure or taxation-to-GDP ratio.
2
  This definition encompasses 
elements of short-term financial risk (that is, whether a government’s financial position is 
robust to revenue volatility) and long-term financial sustainability. 
To focus subsequent discussion, it is helpful to write down the basic fiscal sustainability 
condition that emerges from the government intertemporal budget constraint (IBC).  In a 
growing economy, where output grows at the rate  n g  (where 1 (1 ) nn n Yg Y − =+ ), the 





nn n n n
nn n n n








where ni B −  is the level of nominal government debt at the end of year ni − , G  is the sum 
of government primary expenditure, T  is government revenue from taxation and r  is the 
interest rate on outstanding government debt.  
Unless there is a limit on the government debt-to-GDP ratio, this expression does not 
impose any restrictions, from a sustainability perspective, on fiscal policy or the level of 
debt.  Furthermore, consideration of a framework for an optimal level of debt has 
concluded that there is no single level of debt that can be considered optimal no matter 
what the particular circumstances are.  However, there are other frameworks which 
government could use to set the appropriate level of debt.  One approach is to consider 
that current consumption should be financed from current taxation, but allow capital 
expenditure to be financed out of debt.  Another approach is to consider debt as the 
residual of all other budgetary policy decisions. This suggests that an optimal debt policy 
can be derived by deciding on the desired size of government and on the best financing of 
this expenditure, be it tax or debt policy or a mix of both, considering the trade-offs that 
apply  (CS First Boston, 1995).  Other considerations include the role of debt as an 
automatic stabiliser and inter-generational equity.  Whatever the reasons for raising debt, 
it is common practice for governments to recognise the need to operate fiscal policy within 
the bounds of a target level of public debt.  The reasons for this are discussed in the next 
section. 
Conceptually, the Government Budget constraint and fiscal gap can be considered over an 
infinite horizon.  However, in practice Governments tend to set themselves goals over a 
limited horizon.  This reflects the fact that fiscal programmes change when governments 
change and that there is uncertainty about the future.  Furthermore, adjusting policy settings 
today, to account for possible future structural change, is not necessarily optimal.  In 
particular the judgement to make adjustments should take account of the “option-value of 
                                                                  
2  The Treasury Statement on the long-term fiscal position adopts this approach (The New Zealand Treasury, 
2006),   
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waiting” for better information.  This approach could take explicit account of the uncertainty of 
future economic conditions and the potential relative costs of fiscal adjustments made later 
rather than earlier, in a manner similar to the approach developed, for example, for fixed 
investment decisions (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).  Furthermore, adjusting policy settings by 
trying to maintain a constant tax rate over the longer term, when there is structural change, 
can result in higher government expenditure than would otherwise be the case, and hence 
suboptimal results (Pinfield, 1998). 
Given the discussion above, suppose that there is a binding debt target in some future 
yearN .  Using expression (1) and assuming the economy starts in year  0 n =  and 







, by substituting forward to year 1 N−  and by imposing 
a binding debt constraint for year N , the government intertemporal budget constraint can 



























  (and   1 1 ρ− ≡ ). 
Expression (2) is an expression of the constraint that must be satisfied if a government is 
to satisfy its fiscal sustainability objective.  It implies that, if there is a binding debt target in 
yearN , the government intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) requires that the present 
discounted value of future primary balances must be equal to the difference between 
initial debt and the present discounted value of terminal debt.  It shows the present 
discounted value of the increase in primary balances necessary to guarantee the IBC is 
fulfilled. 
Expression (2) can be rearranged to define the fiscal gap,FG , in the current year.  This 
represents the gap between two components: (i) the difference between the current debt 
ratio and the present discounted value of the future binding debt constraint, and (ii) the 
present discounted value of future primary balances.  This gap can be eliminated by some 
combination of changes to the present discounted value of future taxation and 















=− − − ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ∑  (3) 
Expressions (2) and (3) help put into context the issues relevant to the discussion in the 
remainder of this section and in sections 3 and 4.  In terms of our earlier definition, “the 
feasibility of funding a given expenditure programme under the prevailing taxation 
structure or taxation-to-GDP ratio”, by representing the given expenditure programme by 
the present discounted value of future expenditure component of expression (3), the fiscal 
gap would represent the taxation revenue gap that would be required to be closed in order 
to simultaneously sustain this expenditure programme and satisfy the IBC condition.   
What is clear from expression (2) is that the lower is the debt target ratio for a given initial 
debt ratio, the higher is the level of present discounted value of future primary surpluses 
required to realise that target and satisfy the IBC.  Considerations influencing the choice 
of an appropriate target debt ratio, discussed next, are therefore crucial.  
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Also crucial is the process for deciding on the efficient level of government expenditure 
and its path over time.  What is more, it is clear from expression (2) that if fiscal policy can 
have significant leverage over GDP growth by, for example, manipulating the composition 
of  T  and G , then this represents another option for satisfying the IBC while 
simultaneously contributing to growth (higher growth will raise N ρ ).  This argument, of 
course, assumes that government spending does not rise with income growth at a rate 
that offsets this effect.  We discuss in section 3 how the structures of expenditure and 
taxation impact on growth, and we consider in section 4 how macroeconomic stability 
contributes to growth and whether fiscal policy has a role to play in enhancing 
macroeconomic stability.   
2.1  Fiscal sustainability and economic growth  
As discussed above, sustainable public finances, represented by the maintenance of 
prudent debt levels over all time periods, are important from an economic perspective 
because this property can impact on private decisions for several reasons.  This is 
because fiscal sustainability will influence, among other things, the stability of taxation 
rates and government expenditure programmes, the cost of capital and the ability of fiscal 
policy to act as an automatic stabiliser.  Fiscal sustainability can also impact on trend 
inflation and financial system stability.
3   
Sustainable public finances can result in more efficient public financing by allowing 
government to maintain stable taxation rates.  Sustainable public finances maintain the 
ability of government to raise debt at reasonable cost in the face of adverse shocks to the 
fiscal position, as opposed to changing tax rates.  That stable taxation rates minimise the 
cost of raising taxation revenue is illustrated by the taxation rate smoothing literature 
(Barro, 1979).  Varying taxation rates across time to finance variations in government 
expenditure is costly.  This is because the adverse effects of taxation on welfare and 
growth increase more than proportionately with the taxation rate.  Taxation smoothing also 
allows fiscal policy to act as an automatic stabiliser, and hence support macro-stability.  
However, in order for tax rate smoothing to be optimal, the cost of public debt must not be 
increasing more than the cost of raising taxation revenue.  If the cost of public debt 
increases with the level of public debt, then the benefits of tax smoothing and fiscal 
stabilisation will be eroded.   
Further, unsustainable fiscal programs risk sudden and unexpected adjustments to fiscal 
policy.  Volatility in taxation rates and core government expenditure can create uncertainty 
which can reduce private investment and impose adjustment costs.  For example, if public 
funding for tertiary education expenditure is highly uncertain, individuals may be 
discouraged from undertaking higher education.  Sustainable public finances are also 
important for macroeconomic stability.  Volatility in the components of fiscal policy can 
impact on private investment by generating greater volatility in interest rates, exchange 
rates, cash flow and by increasing uncertainty. 
Governments tend to raise debt for reasons other than taxation smoothing or to provide 
automatic fiscal stabilisation.  For example, debt financing is often seen as appropriate to 
fund capital expenditure, particularly when that expenditure earns a positive financial 
return.  Given this, there are a number of reasons for government to set some target 
public debt ratio or “prudent” level of debt.  These include the presence of borrowing 
                                                                  
3  Sustainability is also important from the point of view of intergenerational equity.  
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constraints, the potential inflation implications of high levels of public debt, and uncertainty 
as to the future fiscal position. 
High levels of government debt may be costly if large injections of debt financed 
government expenditure crowd out private sector spending by driving up real interest 
rates and exchange rates and relative prices.
4
  This will be costly to growth if government 
productivity is lower than private sector productivity (Baumol, 1967).  In addition, high 
levels of government debt, or default on debt by governments, can crowd out private 
investment by increasing the risk premium on borrowing for private agents as well as 
government.
5
  High levels of government debt can also create risks for macroeconomic 
stability if the government borrows domestically and if the risk of government default 
raises domestic financial system risks.
6
 
Further, high levels of government debt can lead to difficulties in controlling inflation.  For 
example, Sargent and Wallace (1985) consider the situation of a government running 
deficits which are financed by issuing government bonds.  If these deficits are 
unsustainable, in that government will not be able to finance deficits indefinitely through 
issuing bonds, then eventually the outstanding debt will need to be financed by an 
increased level of currency, and hence could lead to higher inflation in the future.  Further, 
if demand for money actually depends on expected inflation, then unsustainable deficits 
could lead to higher inflation in the present period.
7
    This argument illustrates an 
important nexus between fiscal and monetary policy and it justifies fiscal sustainability 
from the perspective of inflation targeting.  It is another reason to consider deviation from 
strict tax smoothing debt policy if, despite satisfying the intertemporal budget constraint, 
large swings in the level of public debt impact adversely on inflation expectations. 
Another issue is the need to provide insurance in the face of uncertainty.  The existence of 
uncertainty implies that fiscal forecasts and projections are not deterministic, and hence 
policy must provide for random shocks.  Insurance against shocks will be particularly 
important when the need for taxation in the future is negatively correlated with private 
consumption.  When this correlation is negative, the need for taxation increases would 
occur when individuals can least afford them. The susceptibility of New Zealand to volatile 
productivity shocks arising from terms of trade and climate shocks is a prima facie reason 
to suggest that the correlation between taxation revenue needs and private income and 
consumption will be negative.
8
  However, CS First Boston point out that the case for 
insurance may be weakened if individuals are willing to reduce their consumption of 
                                                                  
4   For example, in the Mundell-Fleming open economy sticky-price model a debt-financed fiscal expansion 
puts upward pressure on interest rates and the real exchange rate, and reduces private investment and net 
exports.  In the case of perfect capital mobility the initial fiscal expansion completely crowds out private 
sector spending. 
5  Evidence of this comes from studies which show that US states with legislated expenditure targets face 
lower borrowing costs than those without such targets (Eichengreen and Bayoumi, 1994; Poterba and 
Reuben, 1999). 
6   Giammarioli, Nickel, Rother and Vidal (2006) provide a useful discussion of potential financial indicators of 
short-term government financing risks.  This is an aspect that perhaps warrants deeper consideration than 
provided in this paper.  
7  Several versions of the fiscal theory of the price level have evolved since Sargent and Wallace’s paper; 
some are based on the government budget constraint and some are based on the implications of game-
theoretic conflicts between fiscal and monetary authority objectives.  See also Allsopp and Vines (2005) 
who show that unsustainable fiscal policy will hinder the monetary authority’s ability to control inflation. 
8  This argument is supported by New Zealand business cycle research.  For example, Kim, Buckle and Hall 
(1994) reveal a high contemporaneous correlation between fluctuations in New Zealand’s terms of trade, 
real gdp growth and private consumption growth.   
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publicly-provided goods and services during adverse economic conditions.  Insurance 
against shocks could be in the form of keeping debt at levels lower than strictly required, 
maintaining an asset buffer which could be run down in the face of shocks or through 
precautionary taxation.  CS First Boston (1995) argue in favour of precautionary taxation, 
that is higher current taxes and higher Crown net worth than required to fund expenditure.     
2.2  What are the challenges in obtaining sustainability? 
The time path of the primary fiscal balance is critical to achieving sustainable fiscal policy.  
Across both developed and developing economies, the achievement and maintenance of 
primary fiscal balances commensurate with fiscal sustainability has proved to be a difficult 
challenge.  Experiences with rising budget deficits and inflation across a number of 
countries from the late 1960s to the 1980s prompted interest in the way the design of 
policy institutions can influence macroeconomic outcomes, including overcoming the 
tendency for fiscal “deficit bias”.  Deficit bias can be attributed to two main sources. 
First, political economy problems can lead to a level of debt which is socially suboptimal.  
For example, governments guided by immediate political priorities and the desire to be re-
elected have an incentive to raise debt now to fund present expenditure, and thereby shift 
costs onto future generations.   Similar to the time inconsistency arguments discussed 
below, this behaviour arises from a high discount rate on the future (Kennedy and 
Robbins, 2001).  This myopia may have a cost today in terms of an increased risk 
premium, as it will be difficult for government to credibly commit to paying back debt in the 
future.  All else equal, the likelihood of deficit bias is influenced by the type of political 
system.  Stein, Talvi and Grisanti (1999) find that electoral systems which exhibit a high 
degree of proportionality tend to lead to larger fiscal deficits, although Hallerberg and von 
Hagen (1999) find that negotiated spending targets can sometimes limit deficit growth in 
proportional systems. 
A fiscal deficit bias may also arise if governments have a tendency to raise their spending 
during periods of strong income and taxation growth but struggle to reduce spending 
when taxation revenue declines (as this requires ending existing programs).  In those 
circumstances, government expenditure and fiscal deficits will tend to rise over the longer 
term (Alesina and Perotti, 1995). 
Second, weak fiscal institutions make it difficult to manage fiscal deficits.  For example, 
where tax collection and budget management capacity is inadequate, fiscal discipline will 
be compromised.  Inadequate budget systems in China evidently mean that the Budget is 
not an effective instrument to curb expenditure.  Governments at all levels spend funds not 
only allocated through the Budget process but also obtained off-budget by, for example, 
leases over land and charges (Dingjian, 2007).  This means there is no effective central 
monitoring of expenditure.  Another challenge in managing potential contingent liabilities 
(such as the risk of a natural disaster) is uncertainty as to the likelihood and size of that 
liability.  As measures taken today to provide funds or mechanisms for a future risk 
impose costs on the current taxpayers, good information is needed for efficient risk 
management.  
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2.3  What approaches has New Zealand applied? 
2.3.1 Fiscal  framework 
Sustainability concerns have influenced both the design of public institutions and the 
conduct of fiscal policy in New Zealand.   For example, in terms of institutional design, the 
delegation of regulatory policy to independent agencies in many cases was considered to 
help manage risks to the government balance sheet.  For example, the delegation of 
banking regulation to the Reserve Bank is intended to limit government’s exposure to 
financial sector distress, first by ensuring financial institutions are unlikely to fail and, 
second, by removing any explicit government guarantee of the financial system.  Although 
these institutional responses are important to manage risks facing the government, this 
paper focuses on the design of fiscal institutions. 
New Zealand has put considerable weight on the design of fiscal institutions to help avoid 
deficit bias and reduce and maintain a lower debt ratio, and to provide appropriate 
information for decision making.   One of the key tenets of the Public Finance Act 1989 
(PFA) is to allow for government decision-making to be disciplined through setting out 
requirements for information provision, transparency and accountability.
9
  These 
disciplines can occur through the electoral process, through market mechanisms (such as 
increases in risk premia on lending) and rating agencies or through external 
commentators.
10
   
However, although transparency will discipline government by holding decision-makers to 
account, market-led adjustment can be abrupt and costly.
11
  Furthermore, transparency is 
not necessarily sufficient to avoid deficit bias because future generations do not have a 
voice.  Hence the PFA transparency provisions are reinforced in New Zealand by the 
principles of responsible fiscal management. 
2.3.2  Principles of responsible fiscal management 
The principles of responsible fiscal management, specified in Section 26G of the Public 
Finance Act 1989, are summarised in Table 1.  They are a set of guiding principles 
designed to be appropriate under any administration.  Aside from the requirement that, 
once prudent levels of debt have been achieved, governments must maintain those levels 
by ensuring that on average (over a reasonable period of time) total operating expenses 
do not exceed total operating revenue, the principles do not impose mandatory targets.  
This approach was deliberately chosen as it was considered that there was no solid 
justification for any target over a long period of time and it allowed greater flexibility to take 
account of other objectives, such as macroeconomic stability (Janssen, 2001). 
The idea of using guiding principles that are prescribed in legislation has also been 
adopted by Australia and the UK.  In the UK, the actual fiscal rules (that is, the “golden 
rule” and the “sustainable investment” rule) have to satisfy the guiding principles.  This 
                                                                  
9  The Public Finance Act 1989 was amended in 2004 and incorporated the key requirements of the earlier 
Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994. 
10  There are, however, limits on what is desirable to make transparent in cases where agents’ behaviour may 
be adversely affected. 
11  Mattina and Delorme (1996) find evidence of a non-linear supply of credit function for Canadian provincial 
governments.  
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approach is in contrast to the Stability and Growth Pact in the European Union which fixes 
an upper limit on public deficits and debt. 
Restrictions on the budget balance are the most common fiscal rule applied 
internationally.  In a study of these rules, Poterba (1997) concludes that balanced budget 
rules are effective in influencing fiscal outcomes.  In common with many other countries, 
the New Zealand principle is defined to apply on average, allowing deficits when growth is 
below trend and surpluses when growth is above trend.  This approach provides scope for 
more efficient financing as it allows for tax smoothing and the operation of automatic 
stabilisers.  It also supports sustainability to the extent that it prevents cyclical increases in 
revenue being spent on ongoing expenditure. 
The New Zealand balanced budget principle is specified to apply only to the current 
operating balance, therefore allowing borrowing to fund capital spending.  To avoid a large 
build-up of debt, the principles also require that government maintain a prudent level of 
debt and net worth and make these intentions transparent.  In this regard, governments in 
New Zealand have set self-binding debt targets as a long-term objective. 
2.3.3  PFA: Reporting requirements 
The fiscal responsibility section of the PFA requires the production and reporting of 
comprehensive financial information.  These requirements seek to improve decision 
making by ensuring decision-makers have comprehensive financial information available 
on the short, medium and longer term, improve accountability through transparency and 
reduce opportunities for manipulation by providing for independence in the preparation 
and audit of financial information. 
Information requirements include production of a government balance sheet and fiscal 
forecasts on an accrual basis over a period of at least three years, and reporting of 
specific fiscal risks to which the government will be exposed.  All Crown reporting entities 
are subject to reporting and monitoring requirements, including a statement of service 
performance that is included in the audited financial statements.  These reporting and 
monitoring requirements were introduced as a critical component of the comprehensive 
programme of public sector management reform introduced during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s in which chief executives became explicitly accountable for the performance 
of government departments and were given greater discretion over the acquisition and 
utilisation of resources (McCulloch and Ball, 1992). 
Independence requirements include the use of financial reporting standards, independent 
preparation of the fiscal and economic forecasts by the Treasury and independent audit of 
financial statements.  Recently, International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
adjusted for the public sector have been adopted.
12
   In addition, the Public Audit Act 
(2001) requires that the Auditor General provide an ex-post  audit of appropriations 
administered by departments or Officers of Parliament to ensure that expenses and 
capital expenditure is appropriately authorised and incurred for the purpose for which it 
was intended.  Under the Controller function in the PFA, the Controller and Auditor 
                                                                  
12  Reporting standards relate to recognition, measurement, presentation and disclosure of assets, liabilities, 
revenue and expenditure and related cash.  The IFRS provides an internationally recognised and more 
comprehensive set of standards than previously applied in New Zealand.  The main implications for the 
New Zealand fiscal statements are in the enhancement of consistency and in the measurement of 
insurance and defined retirement benefit liabilities.  These changes generate minor alterations in the 
measurement of net worth and the operating balance (See The Treasury, 2007, pages 90-91).  
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General monitor the incurrence of expenses and capital expenditure against 
appropriations throughout the year (The Treasury, 2005b, page 26). 
The Fiscal Strategy Report (FSR), is a key tool to make government’s medium-term 
intentions explicit.  In the FSR, the government is required to set long-term objectives 
(over a period of 10 years) and short term intentions (over a period of 3 years) relating to 
debt, operating balance, net worth, revenues and expenses.  Government is also required 
to provide fiscal projections over a period of at least 10 years and assess the consistency 
of the projections with the 10-year objectives specified in the FSR.  The objectives act as 
a form of self-binding rule which the government outlines to the public, and states how 
government intends to ensure it will maintain a prudent level of debt and net worth. 
The sustainability framework has recently been reinforced by the requirement for the 
Treasury to publish at least every four years, a statement of the long-term fiscal position 
(LTFP) for a horizon of at least 40 years.
13
  The first statement was published in 2006 (The 
Treasury, 2006).   In contrast to the FSR, the Statement and projections it contains is a 
Treasury document based on The Treasury’s assumptions.  Although, the Statement is 
required to be published, the fiscal framework does not require Government to adjust 
current fiscal policy if that policy is consistent with the debt objective over a 10-year time 
horizon, even if it implies a rising debt ratio over a 40-year time horizon. 
2.3.4  Fiscal policy: Long-term objectives 
Successive governments have shown a strong commitment to the principles of 
responsible fiscal management and to setting and achieving challenging long-term 
objectives.  The PFA allows different governments to specify differing objectives, 
depending on their particular policy agenda, whilst being consistent with medium-term 
sustainability.  External parties have also focused on governments’ stated intentions, 
hence providing discipline. 
To illustrate, in 1998 and 1999 the Government focused on expenditure control, debt 
reduction and tax relief.  This was expressed through the long-term objectives to reduce 
the level of gross debt to 30% of GDP, and to “limit the burden of State spending on 
current and future taxpayers by focusing on the efficiency and quality of expenditure and 
by reducing expenses to below 30% of GDP” and to “use a low-rate, broad-based tax 
regime to raise sufficient revenue to meet its long-term operating balance objective of 
running surpluses, on average, over the economic cycle.” 
Since 1999, the Government has followed a strategy focused on the longer-term 
sustainability of public finances by continuing the reduction of gross debt and by building 
up financial assets.  In particular, since 2001 the Government has specified in its long-
term objectives that operating surpluses will be large enough to pre-fund some of the 
costs of the ageing population through contributions to the New Zealand Superannuation 
Fund (NZS Fund).  The focus on reducing debt has also seen the debt target being 
progressively reduced to the current one of maintaining gross sovereign-issued debt 




                                                                  
13  The rationale for this “Statement on the long-term fiscal position” and the key judgements required to 
prepare the Statement are discussed in Rodway and Wilson (2006). 
14  See, for example, the Minister of Finance’s 2007 Fiscal Strategy Report, page 52 (Minister of Finance, 
2007).  
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The debt target has been the main anchor to restrain government expenditure growth over 
recent years.  It is common to see Government scaling back (or increasing) new 
expenditure programs during the Budget process in order to remain consistent with the 
debt objective. 
2.3.5 Fiscal  management 
Fiscal management encapsulates the processes and rules that link budget decisions to 
the sustainability framework. 
Prior to 2003 the Government used a provisions framework to manage Budget decisions.  
Under this framework, a fixed three-year nominal spending amount was set (called the 
“fiscal provision”).  This approach was introduced at the time when New Zealand moved to 
a parliamentary electoral system of proportional representation.  The cap was motivated 
by concerns that a coalition government would usher in a period of fiscal imprudence.  As 
the provision was intended to cover controllable expenditure only, there were detailed 
rules for what did and did not “count”.  The provision was intended to be set at the 
beginning of the three year parliamentary term and not changed.  In practice, however, it 
was changed in times of significant economic shocks (such as the successive droughts 
and the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and 1998).  Nevertheless, the provisions framework 
improved on previous approaches by providing a tangible constraint on spending, shifting 
the focus from a one year to a three-year spending track and making forecasts more 
realistic (Vandermolen, 2002, page 7). 
In 2003, the Government moved to a new fiscal management approach (FMA).  The 
motivation for this was in part to achieve greater consistency between Budget decision-
making and the long-term (10-year) objectives (Vandermolen, 2002, page 4). Under this 
approach the Government communicates spending and taxation intentions by explaining 
how these intentions relate to a desired 10-year operating balance and debt track.  New 
operating initiatives and capital expenditure must be funded out of a specified accrual- 
based allocation for a given Budget, known as the operating ”allowance” and capital 
“allowance”, which is consistent with the overall fiscal strategy.
15
   
Under the FMA, operating and capital allowances are reassessed during the Budget 
process to ensure Budget decisions remain consistent with long-term objectives.  When 
the FMA was designed, it was envisioned that allowances for the next Budget would be 
reasonably firm and changes would most likely occur in future years (Vandermolen, 
2002).  In practice, over recent years, allowances for the next Budget have been revised 
frequently and by significant amounts in response to upward revisions of tax revenue 
forecasts and lower-than-budgeted expenditure.  Since the beginning of the century, 
successive FSRs have reiterated the view that there has been a permanent increase in 
the level of government revenue allowing increases in allowances which are consistent 
with the fiscal strategy.   
The model used to assess whether a particular operating or capital allowance is consistent 
with the medium and long-term fiscal objectives is the Fiscal Strategy Model (FSM) 
developed by the Treasury, discussed below.  The FSM provides projections of the impacts 
of fiscal policy decisions on the operating balance, revenue, expenses, debt and net worth.  
Long-term fiscal projections based on the FSM have proved to be a very important tool for 
                                                                  
15   See for example the Treasury (2007), Economic and Fiscal Update, page 97.  
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decision making, with new spending allowances (in current or future years) being increased 
or decreased in order to maintain consistency with long-term objectives. 
2.4  Fiscal sustainability outcomes 
New Zealand’s fiscal position is sound by historical and international standards. 
New Zealand is amongst a small group of OECD countries with a positive net financial 
asset position (see, for example, 2007 FSR, page 40 of Budget 2007).  Figure 1 shows 
that there has been a steady decline in the public gross debt-to-GDP ratio over recent 
years.
 16
  Gross Sovereign-Issued Debt (GSID) has fallen from 37.7% of GDP in 1998 to 
23% of GDP in 2007.
17
  Simultaneously, large operating surpluses over recent years have 






The strength of the fiscal position has been noted by international credit rating agencies 
and has been a determinant of New Zealand’s sovereign credit rating.  For example, 
Standard and Poor’s recently maintained New Zealand’s sovereign credit rating whilst 
noting that current macroeconomic imbalances meant that there was some potential that a 
shock to the economy could have a negative impact on government finances.  However, 
they remarked that “the low level of net debt provides a strong buffer to absorb any such 
shock without threatening credit quality” and hence “only a significant and unexpected 
weakening of government fiscal policy is likely to lead to a down grade in the next few 
years” (Standard and Poor’s, 2007). 
These achievements have been associated with a strong period of economic growth and 
Budgets that helped achieve the transition to higher surpluses required to finance the NZ 
Superannuation Fund.  The reduction in the public debt-to-GDP ratio has occurred as a 
result of nominal GDP growth rather than a reduction in the level of nominal debt.  Higher 
than expected GDP, and hence tax revenue growth, have resulted in Government 
achieving its fiscal objectives faster than expected at the start of the millennium.
19
  
Projections of the government fiscal position are used to assess the medium and long 
term sustainability of government fiscal policy.  The modelling approach is applied in two 
different ways.  First, the Fiscal Strategy Model is used for the purpose of providing 
projections for the FSR, and hence assessing how government intends to meet its 10-year 
objectives.
20
   The model used in the Statements of Long Term Fiscal Position uses the 
                                                                  
16   The ratio of GSID to GDP has usually been the measure used to assess financial performance of the NZ 
public sector since 2002.  This choice was a judgement based in part on the fact that there is not a 
standard measure of net debt.  However, more recently there have been situations when there have been 
increases in GSID that have left net debt unchanged.  One example is when the RBNZ’s cash settlement 
process was changed (See Minister of Finance, 2007, Fiscal Strategy Report, page 45).  
17  According to CS First Boston (1995), New Zealand’s gross sovereign issued debt was145% of GDP in 
1945; it fell to around 42% in 1973, rose again to 77% by 1987.  GSID has fallen gradually since the late 
1980s (See Figure 2).  
18  The essential features of the NZ Superannuation Fund are explained in McCulloch and Frances (2001) and 
details of the governance arrangements are available from http://www.treasury.govt.nz/release/super/ and from 
the Fund’s own internet site http://www.nzsuperfund.co.nz/.  
19   For example, the 2003 Fiscal Strategy Report notes that progress towards long-term fiscal objectives was 
“better than expected at the beginning of the previous parliamentary term” (Minister of Finance, 2003; 
Page 1). 
20   Previously known as the Long-Term Fiscal Model (LTFM), the Fiscal Strategy Model (FSM) is available 
from the Treasury internet site www.treasury.govt.nz/ltfm  
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same projection methodology but makes different assumptions about the level of new 
government initiatives.    
The modelling approach applied in each model is to take the government flow budget 
constraint (expression 1) and project revenue and expenses forward.  The projections of 
GDP,  n Y , are based on demographic projections (including some allowance for changes 
in labour force participation across cohorts) and constant productivity growth.  This 

















Y .  The modelling 
approach reveals the projected time path of each component of the flow budget constraint 
(including the components of taxation and government spending) and the implications for 
the debt ratio in each future time period.   
The difference between the FSM and the model used in the statement of the long-term 
fiscal position (LTFP) is in the assumptions relating to the growth of Government 
expenditure,  n G .  In the model used in the LTFP statement, all expenditure projections 
are developed from a “bottom-up” approach.  Given current fiscal parameters, government 
expenditure,  n G  is grown based on demographic projections, relative price changes for 
some components of government spending (notably health) and assumptions about the 
income elasticity of demand for the current portfolio of public goods (Rodway and Wilson, 
2006; The Treasury, 2006).  In contrast, the FSM is consistent with the Government’s 
approach to fiscal management, and assumes a degree of fiscal constraint in order to 
meet Government’s stated 10-year objectives.  Baseline spending, at the end of the 
forecast period, is projected forward assuming that current policies continue.  New policy 
initiatives are assumed to be funded from an operating or capital allowance.  The 
assumed allowances are reassessed during the Budget process to ensure consistency 
with the fiscal strategy.  The different assumptions relating to growth of new initiatives in 
the model imply that the present values of the operating balances produced by the models 
and projections of debt will differ.   
The modelling approach applied in the Statement is similar to techniques used by the 
OECD, and the Australian and UK Treasuries.  Nevertheless, there are a number of 
issues that need to be recognised when considering the robustness of the fiscal 
projections and policy insights.  These include, for example, the extent to which Ricardian 
behaviour could result in offsetting responses by individuals to emerging fiscal deficits 
(including, for example, changes in private savings and labour force participation), 
feedback effects of government expenditure paths on productivity growth, and feedback 
effects of rising debt levels on interest rates.  These issues are also relevant to estimates 
of the present discounted values that enter calculations of the IBC and the fiscal gap 
(expressions 2 and 3). 
The different assumptions relating to the growth of new initiatives in the models represent 
the different information purposes of the models.  As FSM projections are used for the 
FSR, the assumptions as to growth of new initiatives are set by the Government of the 
day.  These projections therefore provide a means for the Government to communicate 
how it intends to meet its 10-year fiscal objectives. The modelling approach in the 
statement of LTFP provides a projection of outcomes if fiscal parameters remain 
essentially unchanged and policy behaviour is unchanged.  This approach highlights 
future policy challenges by, for example, revealing future gaps between the projected debt 
outcome and the present debt objective if government followed a particular expenditure 
path.  Although the Treasury is still developing its thinking about how to best utilise the  
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insights from the LTFP statement, it has the potential to help communicate the timing and 
reasons for changes in policy parameters. 
Projections from the FSM are published in the annual FSR.  These projections have 
consistently shown Government achieving on its long term objectives.  For example, 
projections in the 2007 FSR (see for example the 2007 FSR, page 48 of Budget 2007) 
show a level of debt consistent with the Government’s objective to maintain GSID-to-GDP 
at around 20% over the projection period. 
The first statement of the long-term fiscal position (LTFP), published in June 2006, shows 
that the fiscal position is strong over the medium term.  However, the statement projects a 
higher path for gross debt from the 2020s.  The ratio of GSID-to-GDP is projected to be 
around 25% in the mid-2020s and rising thereafter (Figure 2).  On the assumption of no 
change in policy, operating expenditure is projected to grow as a percentage of GDP and 
is projected to exceed operating revenue from around 2030.  Two of the main influences 
on government expenditure growth are spending on health and superannuation (Figure 3).  
Superannuation spending is significantly influenced by the ageing population structure.  
Health expenditure has grown significantly over recent years owing to increased coverage 
and rising costs and these are key influences on the projections.  Partly in response to 
this Statement, the current Government has recognised the need to address the growth in 
health expenditure (see for example the 2007 FSR, page 48 of Budget 2007). 
3 Fiscal  Structure 
We define fiscal structure as the composition of government expenditure, the structure of 
taxation, and the overall size of government.  By opening up several avenues through 
which economic growth can occur, endogenous growth models have provided tools for 
investigating how fiscal policy can influence economic growth and have given impetus to 
the idea that the structure of fiscal policy matters for growth.  In an early contribution to 
this development, Barro (1990) demonstrates that certain forms of government 
expenditure can in theory improve economic growth, whereas, if lump-sum taxation is 
ruled out, financing of that expenditure will typically have negative impacts on economic 
growth.  Two important insights emerged from Barro’s paper.  It explicitly demonstrated 
that in theory fiscal policy can impact on economic growth and, moreover, by incorporating 
the government budget constraint it revealed that the growth effects of fiscal initiatives 
were conditional on the method of financing.   
These theoretical insights have been reinforced by empirical research distinguishing types 
of government expenditure and taxation and explicitly incorporating the government 
budget constraint.  As Barro (1990) and Leeper and Nason (2005) have emphasised, 
theoretical work that takes seriously the restrictions imposed by the government budget 
constraint has established some important results.  Accordingly, and following the work of 
Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) and Bleaney, Gemmell and Kneller (2001), there is 
growing recognition that the robustness of empirical tests of the growth effects of different 
fiscal initiatives depends on the appropriate treatment of the government budget 
constraint.  As Gemmell and Kneller (2003) state: “[T]he predicted effects of taxes and 
expenditures on growth rates depends on: (i) the type of tax or expenditure considered 
(and the tax/expenditure mix); (ii) the total level of expenditures; and (iii) how this is 
financed (compensating tax or expenditure change)” (page 2).  Hence, fiscal structure will 
have a substantial influence on economic performance.  
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3.1  Fiscal structure and economic growth 
3.1.1  The structure of expenditure 
There is a long-standing debate in the economic literature about how and the extent to 
which government expenditure can raise long-run economic growth.  According to 
neoclassical growth models, while taxation and government expenditure initiatives that 
influence the savings rate or incentives to invest in physical or human capital may affect 
the equilibrium factor ratios, they do not affect steady-state long-run growth.  The source 
of economic growth in these models is exogenous, being unspecified technological 
change.  Although not casting much light on the sources of growth, models of this form 
nevertheless help us to understand how some types of behavioural change, such as 
changes in labour force participation, may affect factor ratios and the level of income per 
capita.  To the extent that fiscal policy can change these behaviours, it can affect the 
steady-state growth path and transition path but not the steady-state growth rate. 
The fundamental long-run growth mechanism in endogenous growth models is constant 
or even increasing returns to scale for the factors of production which can be reproduced 
by savings and investments.  Long-run growth becomes endogenous in that growth 
depends on investment decisions pertaining not just to physical capital but also to 
investments in knowledge, human capital, research and development and public 
infrastructure.  These decisions may be influenced by the quality of institutions in the 
economy, including financial markets and government regulatory institutions.  They can be 
influenced by fiscal policy, including public infrastructure investments.  Fiscal policy may 
directly raise the marginal productivity of private input factors which encourages their 
accumulation and hence may induce output growth.  This process may occur either 
through the effect on allocation decisions in the private sector or by influencing the 
productivity of factor inputs. 
Public expenditure on various forms of economic and social infrastructure is an example of 
how allocation decisions of the private sector can be influenced by fiscal policy, as is 
apparent from Barro’s (1990) early model of growth which incorporated public infrastructure in 
the representative firm production function.  Several studies have evaluated, for example, the 
effect on private sector productivity of public expenditure on transport and information 
systems (Auschauer, 1989 and 2000; Feehan and Matsumoto, 2002). 
Public expenditures may also have the potential to influence the quality of production 
inputs to private production.  For example if, as Lucas (1988) argues, investment in 
education increases the level of human capital and if the returns to education do not 
decline over time, education funding will be a source of long-run economic growth. 
Although there are many areas where investment can, in theory, improve economic 
growth, the rationale for public provision of services or government funded incentives 
typically rests on the presence of either information asymmetries or externalities.  For 
example, the presence of credit market imperfections and human capital externalities 
provides a rationale for government funding of education (Lucas, 1988). 
Although fiscal policy can have positive impacts on long-run economic growth, fiscal policy 
can also change incentives in ways that are harmful to economic growth.  These costs, 
such as the deadweight loss associated with government discouraging private activity, 
need to be taken into account in any consideration of government involvement.  
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Modern growth literature is therefore intended to clarify where it might be most fruitful for 
policy-makers to focus attention if the objective of fiscal policy is higher income growth.  
That research is not a substitute for robust cost-benefit analysis of fiscal proposals, but it 
may help identify where that analysis may be best applied. 
3.1.2  Financing: the structure of taxation and debt  
As illustrated by expression (1), the flow government budget constraint implies that in any 
period government expenditure can be financed through taxation, raising debt or reducing 
other expenditure.  However, as government must be able to pay back the debt which it 
raises, the budget constraint implies that the present value of the benefits of expenditure 
must exceed the present value of the costs of taxation.
21
  Debt and financial asset 
accumulation therefore shift the financing of expenditure across time.   Nevertheless, as 
Kneller, et al (1999) and Bleaney, et al (2001) show, the form of financing at any point in 
time is important.  That is, the net impact of a category of government expenditure on 
economic growth will depend on how it is financed.  We discuss each in turn, starting with 
taxation. 
Taxation 
The effects of taxation on welfare and long-run economic growth can be considered 
through two lenses.  First, taxation reduces economic growth through reducing incentives 
to work, save and invest.  Second, like expenditure, the taxation system could be 
designed to influence private behaviour in ways considered beneficial for growth.   Below 
we discuss these arguments. 
Empirical evidence on the effects of taxation on growth is diverse.  In his review of some 
of this evidence, Myles (2000) remarks that empirical evidence is “dogged by the difficulty 
of defining the appropriate measure of the tax rate and the choice of appropriate 
regressors.” (page 164).   Nevertheless, he does conclude that the structure of the 
taxation system does seem to be important.  That is, for a given level of revenue, some 
tax structures are more costly to growth than others.  Theoretical models also identify 
several channels whereby the structure of taxation could impact on growth.   
While all taxes reduce incentives to undertake activity, the extent to which a tax 
discourages behaviour will depend on the tax rate and the responsiveness of the agent to 
the tax (elasticity).  For a given responsiveness, the deadweight loss from taxation rises 
more than proportionately with the tax rate.  It rises at approximately the square of the tax 
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⎝⎠ ∑  , which implies all government 
expenditure must ultimately be paid by taxation.    
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rate (Harberger, 1964; Creedy, 2003).
22
   This implies that increases in the tax rate 
applying to a given base will display an increasing marginal cost. 
Given that the deadweight loss of a tax also increases with the elasticity of a particular 
activity, Ramsay (1927) proposed that in order to minimise the distorting effect of raising 
taxation revenue governments should tax each of the multitude of private sector activities 
at rates equivalent to the inverse of the own price elasticity of demand (and cross-price 
elasticities, and so on).  This approach minimises the overall cost of taxation by ensuring 
that the marginal taxation burden on each activity is equal.   However, in general the 
information requirements of implementing Ramsay taxes would make full implementation 
of such an approach intractable.  Furthermore, this conclusion does depend on the design 
of the tax system.  For instance, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) point out that under a 
progressive tax system and certain preference structures, even in theory it may be 
preferable to have uniform consumption taxes.  
One important question is the appropriate tax rate to apply to income versus consumption.  
The importance to growth of capital investment and research and development lends 
support to the argument that a move from less reliance on income taxation to a greater 
reliance on consumption taxation could enhance growth.  The mechanism through which 
this is argued to occur is that income taxes distort the choice between consumption and 
saving by reducing the return on saving.  A shift toward greater reliance on consumption 
tax relative to income taxes reduces the effective price of consumption tomorrow relative 
to the price of consumption today, thereby raising saving and investment.  However, the 
counter to this argument is that, for a given level of revenue, failure to tax capital income 
(under an income tax) requires a higher rate of taxation on labour income, which would 
discourage investment in human capital.   
Aggregate taxation regressions also suggest that the design of income taxes is important.  
There is not scope in this paper to fully review the literature, but a series of studies 
sponsored by the OECD growth project serves to illustrate some potential channels by 
which taxes affect growth.   
In a series of studies evaluating the effect of taxes on the extensive and intensive margins 
of labour supply, the OECD have found that the participation decisions of females may be 
adversely affected by taxation where there is effectively heavier taxation of married 
women relative to men and single women in OECD countries (Jaumotte, 2003).  Other 
work suggests that a high marginal tax wedge influences the hours worked by second-
income earners; that tax incentives for early retirement influenced by retirement pension 
schemes and measured by the implicit tax on continued work, can have a discouraging 
effect on employment amongst older workers; and that the extent to which the tax system 
is progressive can affect the decision to become an entrepreneur.   
Similarly, taxation can affect labour productivity through the effect of income taxes on the 
opportunity cost of investing in tertiary education (Oliveira Martins, Baorini, Strauss and de 
la Masoinneuve, 2007), through the effect of corporate taxes on foreign direct investment 
(Hajkova, Nicoletti, Vartia and Yoo, 2006), and tax policies can be effective at leveraging 
investment in R&D expenditure (Jaumotte and Pain, 2005).  While circumstances will vary 
from country to country, the main point to take from this research is that the structure of 
the taxation system does seem to matter for economic growth.  The importance of high 
marginal tax rates in discouraging economic behaviour supports the principle of seeking to 
                                                                  
22   Creedy (2004) shows that the excess burden =
2
ii /2(X P )T   α where α is the point elasticity of demand 
along the Hicksian demand curve and T the tax rate.  
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marginal tax rates in discouraging economic behaviour supports the principle of seeking to 
minimise deadweight losses through implementing a broad- based low-rate taxation 
system. 
However, Zagler and Durnecker (2003) show that taxation can be designed to influence 
private behaviour in ways considered beneficial for growth.  For example, they show that 
information asymmetries and externalities can be addressed through taxation or 
expenditure measures.  Further if, as Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) stressed, human 
capital is an engine of long-term growth then biasing the tax system in favour of the 
accumulation of human capital may improve an economy’s growth rate.  The conclusions 
drawn by Myles (2000) in his review of theoretical models isolating taxation effects on 
growth are somewhat more cautious.  He remarks that a wide range of theoretical 
predictions arose for the size of the taxation effect and these range from “insignificant to 
dramatically large” and that “theoretical models introduce a range of issues that must be 
considered, but they do not provide any convincing or definitive answers” (page 164).  
Whether the taxation system, as opposed to expenditure initiatives, is used to provide 
incentives to undertake certain activity should be considered in light of a comparative 
institutions approach.  Where there is a clear rationale for government involvement there 
may be instances where the tax incentives could have a net benefit. 
Debt financing  
Debt (or asset reduction) can also be used to finance government expenditure.  The costs 
of debt are also likely to rise with the level of debt.  If households are Ricardian, then 
financing by changing the level of public debt will be perceived as equivalent to a rise in 
taxation and will hence have the same cost as taxation.
23
  However, as will be discussed 
later, evidence suggests that households are not fully Ricardian.  Given this, higher debt 
levels are likely to drive up the real interest rate or exchange rate and the risk premium of 
borrowing, causing some crowding out of private capital accumulation.  Alternatively, as 
discussed earlier, deficits perceived as unsustainable are likely to reduce private capital 
accumulation through higher inflation or uncertainty as to future government expenditure 
or taxation (Tanzi and Zee, 1997). 
Reducing current expenditure 
The third form of financing is to reduce existing expenditure (typically referred to as 
baseline expenditure).  This approach would provide economic benefits when the 
marginal cost of additional financing has reached a level where the benefit of the existing 
expenditure is less than the cost of raising a marginal dollar or where the original 
justification for the programme is no longer valid. 
3.1.3  Size of government and growth  
We have noted that some types of government expenditure can improve long-run growth 
and that since all taxes apart from lump-sum taxes are non-neutral, financing of 
expenditure has economic costs.  Not all expenditure and methods of financing have the 
same impacts on economic growth.  The impact of fiscal policy on growth will therefore 
depend upon the composition of expenditure and the design of the tax system. 
                                                                  
23  Ricardian equivalence implies that agents perceive that increases in debt will require offsetting increases in 
tax at some point in the future, see footnote 21, and hence they adjust behaviour in the current period in 
anticipation.    
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Some have inferred from this approach that it is principally the composition of government 
expenditures and taxes rather than their levels that matters for growth.  Agell, Lindh and 
Ohlsson (1997), for example, comment that this line of reasoning implies “that a 
government wishing to maximise long-term growth must solve an intricate optimization 
problem.  On the margin, the growth promoting effects of increased public intervention 
must be balanced against the growth inhibiting effects of increased taxes and regulations.  
This means that the public sector can either be too big or too small.  Economies with large 
as well as small public sectors may grow slowly; in the former case because of large tax 
wedges, in the latter case because of under-dimensioning of public sector activities” (page 
38). 
Consistent with this reasoning, robust conclusions from the data about the effect of the 
size of government on growth appear to be elusive.  In a comprehensive review of the 
empirical literature, Agell, et al (1997) reiterate the conclusions of an earlier survey of the 
literature by Levine and Renelt (1992) who found that when it comes to the link between 
growth and the public sector the results are spread more or less across the board.   
Similarly, Temple (1999) concludes his review of modern empirical growth research by 
remarking that, “Big government and high taxation may have a negative effect, but the 
evidence is still ambiguous” (page 152).  Agell, et al argue that this ambiguity is due to 
serious problems surrounding data (for example, countries have different conventions for 
defining the public sector), to methodological problems that are without exception difficult, 
and to the absence of a generally accepted theoretical frame of reference to guide 
empirical studies (which means that different studies control for different things which 
makes it difficult to interpret and compare results).
24
   
While these reviews suggest that it is difficult to prove that there is a clear-cut causal 
connection between the size of government and growth, this does not mean that government 
sector growth does not pose growth problems.  From a theoretical point of view it is likely that 
the marginal net economy-wide benefits of fiscal policy are likely to decline as government 
increases in size.  All conventional taxes on income and consumption are distortionary to 
some extent.  Increasing the size of the revenue base is likely to be associated with 
increasing marginal cost.  Similarly, high levels of debt are likely to have a higher average 
cost than lower levels of debt.  Further, not all government expenditures have the same 
impact on growth.  If the most productive proposals are financed first, government 
expenditure will exhibit decreasing marginal benefits.   
There will come a point at which the cost of financing will exceed the benefit of the 
increased expenditure initiative in terms of the impact on long-run economic growth.  That 
is, there will be a point at which marginal government activity will crowd out more 
productive marginal private sector activity.  At this point Baumol’s model of unbalanced 
growth is applicable (Baumol, 1967).  If, at some point, the marginal public sector activity 
is less productive than the marginal private sector activity, then as the share of resources 
claimed by or allocated by public sector institutions increases, economy-wide productivity 
declines unless there are favourable externalities associated with high growth in the public 
sector claim on resources that compensate for these direct productivity effects.   
                                                                  
24  Although Folster and Henrekson (1999) challenge these conclusions, it is not clear that their tests have 
adequately met all the requirements identified by Agell, et al., or have satisfied the insights of Barro (1990).    
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The magnitude of the “Baumol effect” will depend on the institutional and governance 
arrangements applying to public decision-making and the robustness of property rights 
and legal systems.   These “Baumol effects” may not be apparent in empirical cross-
country panel studies in which the differences in structure of taxation and expenditure are 
not correlated with size of the public sector.  Furthermore, studies incorporating financing 
effects of government expenditure have tended to be applied to a limited range of “size of 
government”, notably OECD countries.  Significant size of government effects may only 
be apparent in the data or identifiable for variations beyond this range.  This sample 
selection bias may be important if the composition of government taxes and expenditure 
and the quality of broader government influences on private sector activity, such as the 
quality of regulations, vary with government size.
25
   
However, it seems clear that the composition of government activity is critical to the effect 
of fiscal policy on growth and that studies of the size of government that do not control for 
structure are likely to suffer from identification problems.  While the size of the public 
sector seems unlikely to be irrelevant, aggregate measures of the size of government do 
not provide a good guide as to the growth effects of fiscal policy.  For countries with 
modern institutions and size of governments in the range of OECD economies, the 
approach to analysing the growth effects of fiscal policy initiatives perhaps best lies in a 
more disaggregated level of analysis, an approach that “evaluates the effects of fine prints 
of the public sector.” (Agell, et al, 1997, page 48). 
3.2  What are the challenges in achieving a good fiscal 
structure? 
The previous sections argue that the structure of fiscal policy can have an important role 
to play to enhance long-term economic growth.  The challenge for governments and 
advisors is to turn these insights into practical recommendations.  However, in reality 
there are a number of constraints on the ability of governments to realise the full potential 
of growth-enhancing expenditure and well designed taxation structures. 
First, the information requirements on policy-makers to exploit the insights of endogenous 
growth models are demanding.  Policy-makers must first identify information asymmetries 
or externalities and understand when the market is not able to correctly price these 
externalities.  Even if policymakers can identify externalities and understand the role of the 
market in addressing these externalities, they must also understand how government can 
improve the marginal productivity of the private sector’s physical capital and labour, the 
level at which public provision will crowd out more efficient private activity and the 
appropriate design of governance structures and institutions to deliver public services.  
Similarly, in order for policy-makers to be able to calculate accurately the full economic 
cost of taxation they must be able to understand the private sector response to taxation 
initiatives, including the extent to which a tax will change agents’ behaviour. 
                                                                  
25
  The data problems extend to the type of variables used to capture the dimensions of government.  As 
Wilkinson (2004) observes, the size of government studies that focus simply on the government 
expenditure or revenue ratios may be missing important dimensions of government influence on private 
decisions and productivity.  As he points out, there are several studies that find a significant relationship 
between the index of “economic freedom” or “costs of doing business” and productivity and economic 
growth.  Crafts (2006) provides a succinct review of this research.    
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These demanding information requirements therefore create the potential for “government 
failure”.  For example, even in those areas of fiscal policy that, a priori, might be expected 
to have the greatest potential for growth, there is controversy surrounding the strength of 
empirical estimates.  For example, Zagler and Durnecker (2003) conclude that even for 
estimates of the impact of expenditures on research and development the literature is 
divided.  Similarly, there is a considerable variation in estimates of the effects of 
government infrastructure spending on private investment and economic growth.  For 
example, Perotti (2005) is critical of estimates of production and cost function-based 
estimates of the social returns to public capital expenditure which underpin Aschauer’s 
results (Aschauer 1989, 2000).  Perotti points out that these approaches have not 
satisfactorily controlled for joint endogeneity of public and private production inputs and 
for dynamic macroeconomic effects, and that vector autoregressive modelling approaches 
that endeavour to tackle these problems have tended to reveal much smaller effects of 
public capital spending on economic growth. 
Further, in many cases there may be regulatory or institutional solutions that could more 
directly tackle the market impediment.  Assessment of fiscal policy initiatives should 
therefore be made in the context of comparative institutional advantages and should be 
assessed against an analysis of how private sector responses, coping mechanisms and 
institutions that would evolve in the absence of policy. 
Where it is determined that fiscal policy is the best response, proposals need to be 
assessed under a robust cost-benefit framework.  However, information constraints imply 
that there are limits to the accuracy of cost-benefit analysis.  Aside from the difficulties 
discussed in the preceding paragraphs, full cost-benefit analysis is difficult because the 
cost of financing is crucial to determining the impact of the policy.  Theoretical and 
empirical estimates of the effects of government expenditures on growth will be biased 
unless the cost of financing is explicitly taken into account.
26
   
In the strict tax-smoothing approach discussed by CS First Boston (1995), this financing 
problem is solved by the idea that government expenditure decisions (based on efficiency 
grounds) can in principle be separated from the taxation financing decisions which in turn 
are assumed to also be based on efficiency grounds.  However, government expenditure 
or taxation initiatives may induce behavioural responses that result in offsetting effects on 
growth.  In those circumstances the assumption of independent and non-distorting 
financing decisions may be invalid and the financing of government fiscal initiatives at the 
margin will not be independent of the fiscal initiatives.  However, fiscal institutions are not 
designed to enable identification of the true marginal economic cost of financing a 
particular project. 
Consistent with this argument, Gemmell, Kneller and Sanz (2007) find that in OECD 
countries, fiscal variables (taxes, expenditures and budget deficit ratios) are often 
stationary implying that growth-affecting fiscal initiatives are often reversed.  This implies 
that when governments have increased productive expenditures with growth-enhancing 
consequences, they have simultaneously tended to finance them with increases in 
growth-inhibiting taxes.   
                                                                  
26  Theoretical models that demonstrate the importance of the choice of tax financing in determining the 
growth effects of government expenditures include those developed by Barro (1990), Cashin (1990) and 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992).  
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Another implication of the previous discussion is that evaluation of proposals should not 
simply be limited to new fiscal proposals but should also be applied to the existing 
expenditure base in order to determine whether the funding of new initiatives can be more 
efficiently provided by substitution of prevailing programmes rather than new taxes. 
Political economy literature also highlights constraints on the political process providing 
support for proposals based on a sound cost-benefit analysis, and growth enhancing 
initiatives.  A growing body of literature has, for example, examined the interaction 
between income distribution, political behaviour and growth.  Alesina and Rodrik (1994) 
and Persson and Tabellini (1994), for example, evaluate how democratic institutions deal 
with distribution issues and how those decisions can influence taxation structures and 
growth.   Recent changes to New Zealand’s electoral system may have had implications 
for the way politics and fiscal decisions interact to influence growth.  Wilkinson (2004), for 
example, argues that incentives for sound value-for-money assessments may be even 
more problematic today under New Zealand’s Mixed Member Proportional representation 
(MMP) parliamentary political system given each coalition member has an incentive to 
provide support to their constituents. 
3.3  What approaches has New Zealand applied? 
Mechanisms in New Zealand to support an efficient allocation of public resources are 
focused on transparency and institutional design.  In many areas efficiency is best 
achieved by introducing market mechanisms and allowing consumer choice.  This 
motivated several privatisations of state assets during the 1980s.  However, in cases 
where state provision is still considered best, an efficient allocation of resources is 
encouraged by providing discipline on government expenditure and a clear specification of 
responsibilities. 
At the highest level, the Parliamentary Executive is held accountable for the allocation of 
resources and taxation decisions through the requirement that all government taxation 
and spending decisions be approved by Parliament.  Parliament scrutinises spending 
decisions through debate and through select committee examination.  All new spending 
proposals must be sanctioned by Parliament through an appropriation.  As departments 
may only incur expenses in accordance with an appropriation, this process gives Ministers 
control over the allocation of resources (The Treasury, 2005b).  Spending and taxation 
decisions are made transparent by the publication of the annual Budget and government 
accounts. 
From the mid-1980s, New Zealand undertook a series of public sector management 
reforms in order to support a more efficient allocation of resources.  Reforms were 
motivated by insights from management theory and institutional economics.  Management 
reform was grounded in the principle that resources would be allocated most efficiently 
when public sector managers were given the freedom to make resource decisions and are 
held accountable for these decisions.  As managers will not necessarily have the same 
objectives as the Executive, this model requires clear specification of expectations ex-ante 
and the undertaking of an ex-post review.
27
   
                                                                  
27 Scott (1996) provides a comprehensive discussion of the New Zealand approach to public sector 
management.  See also Evans, Grimes,  Wilkinson and Teece (1996).  
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The implication of these insights was that the best way to promote public sector 
performance is through delegating responsibilities to managers within a framework where 
objectives are clearly specified and lines of responsibility are clear, hence allowing greater 
responsibility to manage.  This is coupled with a corresponding expectation of 
accountability for results through Central Agency monitoring of the performance of 
government entities (The Treasury, 2005b). 
These principles apply to the management of departments and underlie the Public 
Finance Act, State Owned Enterprises Act (SOE) 1986, and the Crown Entities Act 2004 
(CEs).  The State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 is also aimed at improving resource 
allocation by requiring that SOEs be run along commercial lines (Janssen, 2001).  SOEs 
and CEs represent a significant portion of the government balance sheet, being around 
40% of total government assets in 2006/07. 
3.4  Fiscal structure outcomes 
The New Zealand public sector management reforms were intended to improve the efficiency 
of resource allocation.  However, significant challenges still remain.  Strong revenue growth 
over recent years has allowed government expenditure to increase in nominal terms and as a 
percentage of GDP without increasing the debt ratio.  Most of the increase in expenditure has 
been in the areas of health and education (see Figure 4). 
One criticism levelled at the New Zealand approach is “[I]ts failure to do more to impose 
value-for-money disciplines on new and existing government spending.” (Wilkinson, 
2004).  Wilkinson argues that greater use of top-down measures, such as a revenue or 
expenditure objective, could provide greater discipline.  Although the specification of a 
debt objective forces government to prioritise expenditure, Wilkinson notes that it provides 
no top-down constraint on the level of expenditure or taxes, provides limited fiscal 
discipline in a growing economy and is not specifically focused on delivering value for 
money.  Rae (2002) also criticises the system for not providing any formal requirements to 
assess baseline expenditure.  In practice, reassessment of baseline expenditure has been 
difficult.  
Although New Zealand’s tax system remains one of the most broadly based and 
comprehensive in the OECD (Dalsgaard, 2001, page 4), government has shown a 
willingness to use the tax system to address distribution goals and advance other areas of 
economic policy.   This is articulated in the Government’s revenue strategy which includes 
the following statements: “The government’s wider policy objectives for the next three 
years include encouraging productivity, growth and savings.  The quality and design of tax 
policy has an important role to play in support of these objectives”, and “The government 
will consider the use of tax exemptions and concessions only in the context of the full 
range of policy options and only if the benefits can be shown to outweigh the costs for 
New Zealand.” (Fiscal Strategy Report, Budget 2007, page 57). 
Changes to the tax system over recent years include making the system more progressive 
with the increase in the top personal tax rate from 33% to 39% in 1999.  The proportion of 
persons paying personal income taxation subject to the 39% rate has increased from 
about 6% in 1999 to about 12% in 2007.  This change has lifted the marginal tax wedge 
on labour (as measured by the marginal income tax rate at 100% of average worker 
earnings), and lifted the marginal tax wedge above that for Australia (OECD, 2007, Figure 
7).  Nevertheless, the degree of progression of the New Zealand income tax structure 
appears to remain relatively low compared to the income taxation structures in many other  
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OECD economies (OECD, 2007, Figure 8) and the implicit tax on continued work in early 
retirement remains relatively low. 
Other changes include the introduction of R&D tax credits to address concerns about 
relatively low rates of private business investment and measured R&D spending, and 
changes to investment taxation through the introduction of the Portfolio Investment Entity 
regime.  A reduction in the corporate taxation rate from 33% to 30% took effect on 1
st April 
2008.  During the past decade, average corporate tax rates in developed economies 
gradually declined to the extent that, whereas a decade ago New Zealand’s corporate tax 
rate was well below the OECD average, it gradually rose above the OECD average and in 
2006 was the 9
th highest rate in the OECD. The April 2008 reduction brings the New 
Zealand corporate rate closer to, but still slightly above, the OECD average corporate 
rate. 
4 Fiscal  stabilisation 
4.1  Why is stabilisation policy important? 
The purpose of a macroeconomic stabilisation policy is essentially to facilitate the 
adjustment of aggregate demand toward its equilibrium path when there are ‘shocks’ 
which cause a significant deviation.  Aggregate supply, driven by demographic trends, 
labour and capital inputs, and technological progress, will at times evolve slower than 
aggregate demand.  Aggregate demand, if forced away from the equilibrium level of 
aggregate supply, may experience large and prolonged deviations because of adjustment 
rigidities across the economy.  Stabilisation policy is motivated by the argument that 
deviations of demand and output from equilibrium (which in principle would imply more 
volatile output growth) can have an adverse impact on long-term GDP.  These adverse 
effects may arise from inflation, uncertainty, hysteresis effects, and costly sudden 
adjustments. 
In New Zealand, as is common in most developed countries that are not part of a currency 
union, the primary responsibility for maintaining macroeconomic stability has been 
assigned to the central bank.  Generally countries consider it appropriate to allow 
“automatic” fiscal stabilisers to operate to ameliorate the effects of demand or supply 
shocks.  However, apart from this view, there is not a clear consensus amongst countries 
as to the appropriate role of fiscal policy in macroeconomic stabilisation. 
4.2  Why do Central Banks have a primary role in 
macroeconomic stabilisation? 
The “new consensus assignment” represents the view that active consideration of 
macroeconomic stability and particularly price stability should be solely the responsibility 
of the central bank, with the role of fiscal policy limited to the operation of automatic fiscal 
stabilisers.  This view emerged after many countries experienced political business cycles 
which contributed to high inflation in the 1970s and 1980s.  New Zealand was part of this 
experience.  Wheeler (1991), for example, concluded that: “[E]xtensive use of fiscal policy 
in a demand management role did not produce sustainable growth and expansionary 
fiscal policy led to a rapid deterioration in the net debt position.”   
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International experience and emerging theoretical developments during the 1970s and 
1980s spawned a reconsideration of the stabilisation role of fiscal policy.  There were two 
main arguments against the active use of fiscal policy for macroeconomic stabilisation.  
One argument was based on the idea that fiscal policy could not affect aggregate demand 
owing to offsetting private sector behaviour.  The other was based around the interaction 
of the incentives of politicians and expectations of private agents which lead to time-
inconsistent discretionary fiscal and monetary policy.  The second argument was 
particularly important in influencing thinking about the role and design of institutions and 
the idea that active or discretionary stabilisation policy needs to be undertaken by an 
entity independent of government.  
4.2.1  Short-run impact of fiscal policy on demand  
One reason why changes in fiscal policy may not impact on aggregate demand is that if 
private agents are forward-looking, their Ricardian behaviour will simply offset the impact of 
discretionary fiscal policy actions.
28
  In response to an increase in government expenditures, 
households may increase saving in anticipation of the need to pay higher taxes in the future.  
Another reason why fiscal policy impulses may be impotent is that it may crowd out (or in) 
private sector activity via changes in interest rates and exchange rates. 
Empirical and theoretical research tends to imply that fiscal policy does not fully crowd out 
private sector demand and can in fact impact on the business cycle.  Solow (2005) and 
others argue that the weight of empirical evidence suggests that any Ricardian effects are 
well below the extent required for full crowding out of private demand.  Theoretical models 
show that even with households displaying Ricardian features, the presence of labour 
market rigidities, in particular, can result in fiscal policy impacting on the business cycle 
(see Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2005).
29
   
Recent vector autoregressive modelling also implies less than full crowding out.  For 
example, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2004) estimate the impact of 
government spending and net taxes for several developed economies.
30
  A similar 
approach has been applied to the New Zealand data by Claus, Gill, Lee and McLellan 
(2006).  They find that impulses to government spending and net taxation lead to short-
run changes in domestic output, with government spending impulses having a larger 
impact than net taxation impulses.  The expenditure and net taxation multipliers for New 
Zealand appear to be smaller than for the larger economies estimated by Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2004), suggesting more significant leakages or crowding out in 
                                                                  
28  This condition only holds under certain special conditions, including the requirement that agents are not 
liquidity constrained. 
29  A larger impact will be found if agents are assumed to be liquidity constrained as well.  Leith and Wren-
Lewis impose an artificial technology shock on output and show that a combination of fiscal instruments 
(that is, direct tax, indirect tax, and government spending) can completely eliminate the deadweight welfare 
loss, reflecting nominal rigidities across wages and prices, of stabilisation.  In contrast, using monetary 
policy alone can offset only around 40% of the welfare loss.  Fiscal policy is shown to be potent in the 
model economy, not because of a lack of conditions required to for Ricardian Equivalence to hold, but 
because taxes influence the relative prices of work and leisure and therefore the supply of labour.  Indirect 
taxation, in contrast to monetary policy, can circumvent distortions associated with monopolistic 
competitive behaviour across product markets. 
30  Blanchard and Perotti estimate fiscal responses for US.  Perotti (2004) estimates fiscal impulses for US, 
UK, Australia, Germany and Canada.  
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a small open economy.
31
  Thus, although fiscal policy actions may be offset to some 
degree, fiscal policy does impact on short-run demand.  Furthermore, just as we found 
that the composition of fiscal policy matters for economic growth, the differences between 
the spending and net taxation multipliers revealed by these vector-autoregressive models 
illustrates the importance of taking into consideration changes in the composition of 
spending and taxation when assessing the impact of fiscal policy on the business cycle.
32
 
4.2.2  Institutional issues  
The second set of arguments about the effectiveness of fiscal policy stems from Kydland 
and Prescott (1977).  They show that where a policy-maker’s objective is to maximise 
social welfare, they have an incentive ex-ante  to prescribe a zero inflation policy 
(consistent with maintaining output at potential) but ex-post to generate surprise inflation 
and temporarily higher demand.  As the policy-maker will not be able to commit credibly to 
the low inflation outcome ex-ante, agents expect the higher inflation outcome and hence 
this is what actually occurs.  This results in an outcome inferior to one under zero inflation.  
The implication of this result is that while politicians care about social welfare, they will not 
have the right incentives to achieve sustained price stability. 
These political economy ideas mean that politicians do not necessarily have the right 
incentives to effectively implement discretionary stabilisation policy, whether that is done 
by fiscal or monetary policy.  One institutional-based solution to this problem is to make 
stabilisation policy, or price stability, the responsibility of an independent non-political 
entity and to ensure that contractually they are committed to that objective and that 
commitment is credible. 
The choice has typically been to place responsibility for active consideration of 
macroeconomic stabilisation in the hands of an “independent” central bank through, for 
example, specification of an objective to maintain price stability whilst limiting the role of 
fiscal policy to the operation of the automatic fiscal stabilisers.  In principle, this 
responsibility could have been assigned to an independent fiscal authority which, if 
provided with the scope to vary taxation, such as varying the rate of the Goods and 
Services Tax (GST), as proposed by Buiter (2006) for example, could have overcome the 
well known inside lags typically associated with fiscal decisions when those decisions are 
part of the legislative process.  A number of other important considerations have 
influenced this choice of solution to the commitment problem including that fact that fiscal 
policy tends to have multiple objectives, tends to be subject to long decision and 
implementation (“inside”) lags, and that adjusting government spending and taxation rates 
may create uncertainty and may result in other government objectives not being fulfilled.   
This final concern in particular is one area in which the structural and stabilisation 
objectives of fiscal policy can potentially be in conflict. 
The international experience with inflation targeting suggests that, in most circumstances, 
the combination of the central bank policy and automatic fiscal stabilisers will be capable of 
stabilising inflation (and hence output) in the face of exogenous shocks to the economy 
(Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001).  However, as Allsopp and Vines (2005) state, that 
                                                                  
31  In an expanded version of their model, Claus, et al find that there is a difference between impulses to 
taxation and to transfers, further reinforcing the importance of distinguishing between the components of 
fiscal policy.  
32  This point has long been understood from the insights of the classical balanced budget multiplier.    
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leaves the question of the role of fiscal policy within an inflation-targeting regime where the 
main macroeconomic concerns are assigned to monetary policy. 
4.3  What is the role of fiscal policy within an inflation 
targeting framework? 
4.3.1  Macroeconomic impacts of fiscal policy 
The point was made earlier in Section 2.1 that when fiscal policy is not sustainable the 
monetary authority may be unable to control inflation.  Hence, sustainable fiscal policy is a 
prerequisite of a successful inflation-targeting regime if private agents are well informed 
and forward looking.  Theoretical macroeconomic models evaluating the implications of 
game-theoretic conflicts between monetary and fiscal authorities have also revealed that 
fiscal sustainability is not a sufficient condition and that conflicting policy objectives can 
result in fiscal policy actions frustrating the stabilisation objectives of the monetary policy 
authority (see for example Buckle and Stemp, 1991).  Fiscal policy should not, therefore, 
be operated entirely independently of monetary policy.  But the extent to which fiscal 
policy should take account of the business cycle in its coordination with monetary policy in 
achieving short-run macroeconomic stabilisation is not a settled issue. 
One view is that when there is an independent inflation-targeting central bank, 
discretionary fiscal policy need not pay any attention to the cycle.  Buiter (2006), for 
example, argues that limiting the role of fiscal policy in stabilisation to the automatic 
stabilisers, which arise on the operating budget, is appropriate.  He argues public 
investment expenditure cannot always be immediately switched on or off, or varied in 
scale, according to the cycle, without causing serious efficiency losses. 
In contrast, Allsopp and Vines (2005) argue fiscal policy should take account of 
macroeconomic stability concerns because fiscal policy influences the mix of policy and 
therefore the configuration of interest and exchange rates.  In particular, they argue that 
there will be times when fiscal policy will itself be the “shock” to demand and the output 
gap to which monetary policy must respond.  Under normal circumstances the monetary 
authority will be able to react to a fiscal shock by changing interest rates.  However, a lack 
of policy coordination where a fiscal stimulus is too pro-cyclical may result in monetary 
policy having to tighten to a greater degree than otherwise to achieve inflation stability.  A 
fiscal expansion that occurs when the economy is operating above trend output will 
provoke a response from the central bank and require a greater adjustment from the 
private sector than if a similar expansion had occurred when demand was below trend 
output.  Allsopp and Vines argue that these costs should be taken into account in 
government fiscal decisions. 
The strength of these respective arguments depends on whether the consequences of 
monetary policy responses are likely to be more damaging than the consequences of 
discretionary taxation and government expenditure policy that takes account of the stage of 
the business cycle.  The risks of a more active fiscal policy have already been touched on 
and depend on whether fiscal institutions can be designed in a way so that fiscal policy can 
take account of macroeconomic stabilisation concerns but not be subject to the political 
economy risks and the risks of adverse long-term impacts on fiscal structure.  The risks for 
monetary policy include the possibility of adverse effects on productivity (arising from 
uncertainty and real interest rate fluctuations) and the political economy consequences of 
higher interest rates or the differential sectoral effects of fluctuations in the real exchange rate  
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that may pose a threat to the sustainability of the framework for monetary policy.  These have 
been issues at the forefront of recent New Zealand debate. 
There are, nevertheless, circumstances in which the case for a stronger focus by fiscal 
policy on the business cycle is more clearly warranted.  These tend to be circumstances in 
which monetary policy is ineffective. 
4.3.2  Fiscal policy when monetary policy is ineffective 
One circumstance under which monetary policy becomes ineffective is when there is a 
“liquidity trap” situation, such as that which Krugman (2005) argues applied in Japan 
during the 1990s.  In this environment monetary policy is ineffective to stimulate activity 
because the nominal interest rate has already hit its lower bound.  Arguably the US 
reached a similar situation after the technology bubble burst at the start of the millennium.  
Fiscal policy could be used in these circumstances to kick-start growth in domestic 
demand.  The authorities face a dilemma, however, if the combination of low growth and 
fiscal expansion threatens fiscal sustainability (Allsopp, 2005).  This potential problem 
illustrates the importance of forward-looking monetary policy that not only dampens 
demand in the face of expansionary shocks, but also tries to avoid the emergence of a 
“liquidity trap” (Ahearne, Gagnon, Haltmaier and Kamin, 2002).
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Another circumstance in which the effectiveness of monetary policy is compromised is 
where the financial system impedes the effective operation of monetary policy 
instruments.  For example, according to Gianella (2007), the level of monetization and 
financial intermediation by banks and financial markets is not sufficiently developed in 
Russia to facilitate a credit channel for central-bank induced interest rates changes.  The 
level of financial system development evidently hampers the efficient circulation of liquidity 
and tends to generate interest rate volatility.  In circumstances when domestic inflation 
and the real exchange rate are being significantly influenced by oil price-generated 
income growth, monetary policy has not been particularly effective and fiscal policy has 
been the primary instrument of macroeconomic stabilisation policy.  One of the factors 
motivating this assignment has been concern that, despite low effectiveness, reliance on 
monetary policy to dampen the inflationary consequences of the terms of trade growth 
could accentuate the real exchange rate appreciation and compromise efforts to diversify 
the production base of the Russian economy. 
Different concerns have been raised in New Zealand about the effectiveness and impact 
of monetary policy in the current environment.  A number of factors have come together 
over the most recent business cycle upswing to test the robustness of monetary policy as 
an effective instrument for macroeconomic stabilisation policy.  One of those factors has 
been, as in Russia, a strong rise in the commodity terms of trade and potential 
implications of further appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
                                                                  
33
  Buiter (2006) commented that “if ever New Zealand found itself in a deep, 1930s-style slump, or in a 
Japanese-style liquidity trap, expansionary fiscal policy, combined with expansionary quantitative-easing-
style monetary policy, would be the appropriate response.  Such exceptional, self-evident conditions calling 
for discretionary fiscal policy are, however, quite unlike the modest cyclical fluctuations that have 
characterised New Zealand since the beginning of inflation targeting.”  Given this situation is not currently 
relevant we do not discuss further.  
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The recent New Zealand business cycle upswing has been associated with a strong 
migration inflow, an exceptional rise in housing demand and household wealth and 
recently an exceptional rise in dairy prices.  Fiscal policy has also been cited by the 
Reserve Bank as one factor stimulating domestic demand (Reserve Bank of 
New  Zealand, 2007).  As housing tends to be a larger share of total wealth of New 
Zealand households than in most other developed economies, the potential wealth effects 
of rising real house prices may be stronger than in other countries with consequentially 
more significant implications for domestic demand. 
Moreover, some have argued that financial developments, including convergence of long-
term interest rates on international rates, robust international financial arbitrage (the ‘carry 
trade’) and mortgage innovations, have combined to alter the way domestic monetary 
policy impacted on demand particularly during 2005 to 2006 (see for example the 
discussion in Grenville, 2006).  As a consequence, the transmission channel for monetary 
policy, it is argued, shifted more toward short-term interest rates and the exchange rate to 
the extent that the New Zealand dollar rose during 2007 to the highest level against the 
US dollar since it was floated in 1985.  Concerns as to the impact of the appreciation of 
the exchange rate on exporters have been one of the motivations for recent assessment 
of the merits of the present macroeconomic policy framework, despite the fact that the 
impact of exchange rate volatility on long-run growth is unclear.
34
   
New Zealand monetary policy has therefore recently had to contend with some typical 
demand shocks, but in an evolving international and domestic financial environment that 
altered the weights on the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy.  Policy-makers 
have been active in evaluating the extent to which fiscal policy could be more counter-
cyclical and could better coordinate with monetary policy and whether regulations and 
taxation policy could be improved to ameliorate the housing cycle.
35
 
4.4  What approaches has New Zealand applied? 
4.4.1 Fiscal  framework 
The principles of responsible fiscal management in the Public Finance Act 1989 (PFA) do 
not explicitly require that government should take stability concerns into account.   
However, they allow the government of the day to operate a fiscal policy which takes 
stability into account, for example, by allowing government to run a balanced operating 
budget on average once a prudent level of debt has been reached and allowing temporary 
departures from the principles.  This does not necessarily ensure, however, that capital 
expenditure decisions that are consistent with the debt objective will necessarily take 
short-run stability conditions into account. 
One of the reasons for not setting mandatory targets in the PFA was to allow fiscal policy 
flexibility to respond to short run circumstances (Janssen, 2001).  The PFA also supports 
macroeconomic stability in that sustainable public finances are a pre-requisite for 
maintaining low inflation and achieving macroeconomic stability. 
                                                                  
34  These concerns have culminated in the establishment of a Parliamentary Select Committee Inquiry into the 
future monetary policy framework, http://www.parliament.nz/en-NZ/SC/SubmCalled/e/5/9/ 
e5978d6efbd74c0ba14f7e05ca86b144.htm 
35  See in particular the Supplementary Stabilisation Report prepared by Reserve Bank of New Zealand and 
The Treasury (2006), and the collection of papers in Buckle and Drew (2006).  
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4.4.2  Fiscal policy and management 
Consistent with the PFA, the current Government’s long-term objectives allow stability to 
be taken into account through the automatic stabilisers by specifying the operating 
balance objective to apply over the cycle.  Although the Government does not have a rule 
or stated intention to run an active counter-cyclical fiscal policy, stability issues are 
considered as part of the annual Budget-setting process and in particular in the setting of 
the allowances for new initiatives.  The setting and publication of these allowances also 
supports macroeconomic stability by providing the private sector and the Reserve Bank 
with greater certainty as to government’s plans (Vandermolen, 2002, page 5). 
In response to concerns about macroeconomic “imbalances”, the Government has 
recently shown an increasing willingness to adjust new operating and capital expenditure 
plans in response to macroeconomic conditions.  For example, some initiatives in Budget 
2007 were deliberately designed with short-term stability concerns in mind, in conjunction 
with medium term considerations.  The introduction to the 2007 FSR stated that “in 
designing Budget 2007 we have had both the short-term and the long-term in mind.  The 
overarching theme of saving and investing is intended to minimise the impact of 
government on some of the imbalances which have built up in the economy” (Minister of 
Finance, 2007, page 38 in the Budget 2007 Fiscal Strategy Report). 
There are no formal requirements for the government to present a measure of the impact 
of fiscal policy on the macro-economy.  However, significant impacts of fiscal policy 
decisions on inflation may be made transparent in the Reserve Bank’s monetary policy 
statements and in fiscal information reported by the Treasury.  The fiscal impulse 
indicator, discussed below, is published on the Treasury website and at times used in the 
Fiscal Strategy Report.  There is also frequent communication between the Treasury and 
the Reserve Bank about the economic outlook, including fiscal policy intentions. 
4.5  Fiscal stabilisation outcomes 
New Zealand’s recent experience with fiscal stabilisation can be divided into an 
assessment of the automatic stabilisers and of discretionary fiscal policy changes. 
The degree to which taxes and transfers co-vary with the level of economic activity is 
critical to determining the degree of automatic fiscal stabilisation.  The degree of 
progression in New Zealand’s income tax structure means that tax revenue increases by a 
greater proportion than the increase in GDP (Fowlie, 1999; Tam and Kirkham, 2001).   
Over the period 1987-2005 New Zealand’s tax and expenditure system resulted in 
“reasonably pronounced counter-cyclical behaviour of the government primary (non-
interest) deficit” (Buiter, 2006, Figure 23, page 50).  But the presence of automatic 
stabilisers does not guarantee counter-cyclical policy. 
Assessing the extent to which discretionary fiscal policy has been pro-cyclical or counter-
cyclical poses significant challenges.  Information on whether changes in the economy are 
cyclical or structural will always be limited.  Recent developments in modelling techniques 
endeavour to allow for the effects of changes in the size of fiscal initiatives, the 
composition of expenditure and taxation (for example, Blanchard and Perotti, 2002), the 
level of public debt (for example, Chung and Leeper, 2007; Favero and Giavazzi, 2007) 
and initial macroeconomic and fiscal conditions (for example, Perotti, 1999; Romer and 
Romer, 2007a).  
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The Government’s operating surplus has risen markedly since the 1990s.  This balance is 
not sufficient to assess the impact of fiscal policy on domestic demand.  The Treasury 
tends to use a suite of fiscal indicators to assess the likely impact of current fiscal policy 
on the business cycle.  One indicator is a fiscal impulse measure based on the change in 
a cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance (Philip and Janssen, 2002).  This indicator attempts to 
gauge the initial (first round) impact of discretionary fiscal policy (measured by the change 
in the structural balance) on aggregate domestic demand.  Data for this indicator is drawn 
from the Statement of Cash Flows and the fiscal balance used to derive the indicator is 
the difference between primary cash from government operations and primary cash 
payments to operations plus capital cash spending. 
Based on current economic information, this measure implies that fiscal policy has tended 
to restrain short-run demand in most years since 2000, with small injections to demand in 
2004 and 2006.  However, as the size of the structural surplus is forecast to decline over 
coming years, this indicator implies that fiscal policy is expected to become less of a 
constraining influence, with a reasonably significant fiscal impulse indicated for 2007 (see 
Figure 5).  Forecasts of the fiscal impulse have, however, been subject to significant 
reassessment over recent years. 
As Philip and Janssen (2002) recognise, this approach to assessing the impact on 
domestic demand needs to be viewed with caution.   It is designed simply to assess the 
initial fiscal injection (or contraction) to demand.  It does not take account of second round 
effects, changes in the composition of the fiscal balance, and the way private expectations 
can influence responses to a fiscal pulse.  Furthermore, recent work by Romer and Romer 
(2007a), using a narrative approach to identify discretionary structural changes to fiscal 
policy in the USA, suggests that the traditional cyclical adjustments to budget data have a 
tendency to overstate the derived structural changes in the budget.  If this is correct, the 
fiscal impulse measure may be overstating the size of structural budget balance changes 
and therefore the size of the derived contraction (or impulse) to domestic demand. 
An alternative approach to assessing the impact of fiscal policy on New Zealand GDP using 
vector-autoregressive (VAR) modelling has been developed by Claus, Gill, Lee and McLellan 
(2006).  This approach attempts to measure both the initial (first round) effects and the 
induced effects of discretionary fiscal policy on domestic demand by explicitly estimating and 
incorporating private sector responses and response lags.  It also takes account of 
compositional effects by estimating separately the impact of changes in government 
expenditure and government revenue on GDP.  Data for this VAR-based approach is drawn 
from Statistics New Zealand’s quarterly National Accounts (using SNA93 standards).   
Although the data are derived on a different conceptual basis from the cash-based series 
used by Philip and Janssen, the fiscal balance measures are similar. 
Refinements of this vector-autoregressive approach are currently being investigated in the 
Treasury.  The results from this VAR work to date suggest that fiscal policy has generally 
been pro-cyclical during the late 1990s and from 2001 to 2003, and has tended to be pro-
cyclical again in 2004 and 2006 (see Figure 6).  The estimated size of the fiscal impulses 
is often smaller and the pattern quite different from that implied by the traditional Treasury 
measure of fiscal impulse (see Figure 7).  This difference reflects, in part, differences in 
the way discretionary policy changes are identified and the fact that the VAR approach 
applies different weights for the expenditure and revenue impacts on domestic GDP.   
When the expenditure and revenue components of the traditional fiscal impulse indicator 
are weighted by the multipliers derived from the structural VAR model, the size of the 
traditional fiscal impulses tend to be smaller, although the direction of changes still differ 
from the fiscal VAR impulses in some periods.  
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Differences also arise from the fact that the VAR approach explicitly captures the 
interactions between fiscal variables and the business cycle and explicitly captures some, 
but not all, fiscal composition effects.  Composition effects are likely to have been 
important.  For instance, much of the recent growth in government expenditure has been 
in areas where a significant demand impact can be expected, such as consumption of 
non-tradable goods and services, wages of public sector employees and transfers to low 
and middle-income households (for example, the Working for Families package). 
Furthermore, there are various reasons to think that an assessment of the impact of 
growing taxation revenue growth should take account of the circumstances explaining the 
taxation revenue growth and how individuals and firms may respond to taxation revenue 
growth.  If households tend to be more likely to be finance-constrained than firms, then it 
would be important to distinguish between the sources of taxation revenue growth.  The 
strong rise in the government operating surplus in recent years has been in part the 
consequence of an unexpectedly strong growth in company tax revenues.  This taxation 
growth may have less of a constraining influence on business investment and domestic 
demand than, say, an equivalent growth in personal income taxation revenue would have 
on household consumption demand if households are more likely to be finance-
constrained than firms. 
Similarly, as Dunstan, Hargreaves and Karagedikli (2007) argue, this increase in 
corporate tax revenue may not have had as large an effect on domestic demand as an 
equivalent increase in government expenditure.  Indicators suggest that government 
expenditure growth has been strong over recent years.  Figure 8 shows government 
investment expenditure has gradually increased over recent years.  Table 2 reveals the 
relatively strong growth in public sector employment in recent years.  This has occurred 
during a period of very low unemployment and strong private sector demand for labour. 
Hence, although the practice of Government setting and publishing short-term intentions 
is aimed at supporting macroeconomic stability and although Government has recently 
shown an increasing willingness to adjust new expenditure plans in response to 
macroeconomic conditions, there is contrasting evidence concerning the actual outcome 
of discretionary fiscal policy on the business cycle.  Improving understanding of the impact 
of fiscal policy on domestic demand and the business cycle is an area worth further 
investigation and it is an area in which Treasury is devoting more research.  The recent 
paper by Dungey and Fry (2007) is part of that process. 
5  Contemporary fiscal issues 
The previous sections laid out the reasons why fiscal policy should be viewed through 
sustainability, structure and stability lenses.  These roles are not independent and this 
property can sometimes give rise to awkward policy trade-offs.  In this section we first 
briefly discuss some of the connections between fiscal policy decisions relating to 
structure, sustainability and stability.  We then turn to a discussion of contemporary New 
Zealand fiscal issues under each aspect of fiscal policy and draw out how these 
connections and possible trade-offs can have a bearing on fiscal policy choices and we 
consider possible institutional solutions to these trade-offs.  
WP 08/02 |  ROLES OF FISCAL POLICY IN NEW ZEALAND  33
 
5.1  Implications of links between sustainability, structure 
and stabilisation 
The sustainability, structure and stability roles of fiscal policy are not independent.  The 
structure of fiscal policy has important implications for fiscal sustainability and the 
effectiveness of the stabilisation role of fiscal policy.  To illustrate, the size and structure of 
the tax base determines the level of resources available for government expenditure and 
hence impacts on sustainability.  The design of the tax and welfare systems will impact on 
the size and operation of automatic fiscal stabilisers and therefore the contribution of fiscal 
policy to macroeconomic stability.  Similarly, fiscal sustainability requirements can impose 
a constraint on the overall level and choice of the structure of government expenditure 
and transfers.  Choices around the options for pension policies, for example, and how 
those options interact with an ageing population will have implications for fiscal 
sustainability and for rates of labour force participation. 
There are circumstances under which there are trade-offs between these high-level fiscal 
objectives and circumstances under which they are mutually reinforcing.  For example, 
requiring government to balance the operating budget over the cycle supports 
sustainability by ensuring temporary increases in revenue are not spent on on-going 
expenditure, and supports stability by allowing the operation of the automatic stabilisers.  
However, stability and structural objectives may also be in conflict in circumstances when 
the business cycle is in a phase of excess demand and the preferred structural initiatives 
are expected to have stronger domestic demand effects in the short-term even though 
they may have beneficial long-term supply effects. 
Consequently, these connections will influence policy choices and policy design.  The 
current New Zealand debate around the application of recent fiscal surpluses is an 
illustration.  One choice, for example, would be to reduce taxation revenue.  Recent VAR 
modelling suggests that discretionary reductions in taxation revenue could be expected to 
eventually increase GDP growth (Claus, Gill, Lee and McLellan, 2006).  To what extent 
should government be concerned with the possibility that the immediate effects could 
raise domestic demand, real interest rates and real exchange rates?  Further, any 
reduction in surpluses in the present period needs to be consistent with Government’s 10-
year fiscal sustainability objectives. 
The potential for policy trade-offs of this type raises three critical questions.  One question 
is: how much weight should governments place on each of the three roles?  If weight 
should be attached to each role, at least at some points in time, is the present fiscal 
framework appropriately designed to support each role or should greater weight be placed 
on sustainability or stability?  Consistent with The Public Finance Act, it is well accepted 
that government fiscal policy should be sustainable. The view that fiscal structure is 
important for growth is supported by empirical research, but the appropriate design of 
institutions and rules to facilitate sound decisions that tackle “the fine print of the public 
sector” remain a challenge.  The role of fiscal policy stabilisation is an aspect of fiscal 
policy where a wide diversity of views prevails.  In part this is due to uncertainty around 
the growth effects of interest rate and exchange rate volatility, but also the political 
economy issues.  A second question is the time-frame over which it is appropriate to 
assess sustainability?  Is the current requirement that government set objectives over a 
10 year horizon adequate given looming demographic pressures which arise over a long 
term horizon?  The third question is whether fiscal rules can be designed that can reduce 
potential conflicts between these roles and aid prioritisation of multiple objectives?    
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We do not have definitive answers, but the issues discussed in Sections 2, 3 and 4 need 
to be weighed up in coming to an answer to these questions.  The following sections use 
some of the contemporary New Zealand policy issues to highlight possible areas of further 
work that may strengthen the fiscal framework.  Section 5.2 discusses the role of fiscal 
rules in fiscal structure.  Section 5.3 discusses rules-based approaches to taking account 
of macro-stability in setting the annual Budget.  Section 5.4 discusses recent debate over 
the role of stability in fiscal structure. 
5.2  Could fiscal rules improve fiscal structure? 
The Public Finance Act 1989 requires government to maintain a prudent level of debt.  
What constitutes a prudent level of debt is for the government to define.  However, the 
only requirement in relation to the structure of taxes and expenditure is the requirement 
that government pursue policies which are consistent with a reasonable degree of 
certainty and predictability of tax rates in the future. 
Experience over recent years has shown that a debt constraint can provide discipline on 
the overall level of expenditure, and hence improve prioritisation.  However, a debt 
constraint on its own may impose weak discipline on expenditure in times of strong 
taxation revenue growth.  This has motivated some to argue in favour of fiscal rules which 
do not just focus on debt and the operating balance but provide a direct constraint on 
expenditure or taxation.  While these rules may not be motivated by structural 
considerations, when combined with a debt limit they may, nevertheless, have 
implications for the quality of government expenditure decisions. 
One approach is to apply limits to the level of taxes or expenditure.  These might be 
expected to act as a binding constraint that forces governments to ensure they select 
projects with the highest benefit-cost ratios.  Hong Kong, for example, has a general 
principle that over time the growth rate of expenditure should not exceed that of the 
economy.  This rule is equivalent to an expenditure-to-GDP ratio limit.  Barker and Philip 
(2007) review a number of examples where countries have applied multi-year expenditure 
limits.  Unfortunately the evidence about the impact these limits have on the quality of 
fiscal decisions is limited.  Although expenditure limits may provide incentives for 
departments to consider the priority of new and existing initiatives, there is evidence that 
suggests there are risks with these types of rules that, in times of fiscal stress (revenue 
decline) or declining growth, the expenditure limits are met by reductions to “productive” 
spending. 
Experience with taxation revenue limits applied by US States is discussed by Wilkinson 
(2004).  In some cases these limits have been effective at recycling above-target taxation 
revenue.  However, taxation limits that are not supported by strong controls over 
expenditure can compromise fiscal sustainability when they result in insufficient revenue 
being raised.  The State of Colorado, for example, has suffered fiscal stress which has 
been attributed in part to its taxation limit rules (Wilkinson, 2004, page 54).  Furthermore, 
both expenditure and taxation limits, particularly if expressed in terms of a ratio of GDP 
and if rigidly adhered to, could have the effect of offsetting the role of automatic fiscal 
stabilisers and compromise macroeconomic stability. 
Consideration has been given in New Zealand to rules that sharpen incentives to prioritise 
government spending by providing incentives to government departments to find savings 
in base-line expenditure.  In designing such rules, questions include whether the rule 
should be voluntary or mandatory and the best way to provide incentives for departments  
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to find savings.  As central agencies have limited information on the value-for-money of 
expenditure programs, voluntary rules to find savings are more likely to find the most 
valuable savings than are mandatory rules.  However, under a voluntary rule departments 
will have the best incentives to reprioritise expenditure if they are able to keep any savings 
identified.  This will limit the amount of re-prioritisation as there will be a high correlation 
between where savings are found and where they are reinvested.  It is also important that 
any such rule is specified in a way to find genuine savings.  This would suggest specifying 
the rules so as not to apply to cyclical changes in expenditure. 
5.3  Could rules relating to sustainability take more 
account of stability? 
Fiscal rules and institutions are generally designed to support both fiscal sustainability and 
stability.  The current approach in New Zealand supports the operation of the automatic 
stabilisers on the operating budget, but leaves Government some discretion as to the 
timing of capital expenditure.  Barker and Philip (2007) analyse approaches taken in other 
countries to taking account of fiscal stability in setting the annual Budget.  In general, 
fiscal rules and institutions seek to support monetary policy through allowing or requiring 
the operation of automatic fiscal stabilisers.  Countries do not generally seek to implement 
strict rules which require active fiscal stabilisation.  Nevertheless, some countries, such as 
those operating a fixed exchange rate regime, do seek to use active fiscal policy for 
stabilisation purposes.  We analyse three possible approaches. 
One approach some countries follow is to target a structural budget balance.  This 
approach is followed in Chile, for example, where there is a fiscal rule specifying that 
government spending is equal to the sum of permanent taxation and permanent copper 
revenues.  Cyclical increases in revenue are ring-fenced in the Copper Stabilization Fund.  
In Norway, surplus oil revenues are saved in the Government Pension Fund - Global.  The 
Fund was established in order to offset the effects of declining oil income expected over 
the longer-term, and to smooth out the disruptive effect of volatile oil prices.  Casual 
evidence from Norway and Chile suggests that these rules may have helped stabilise the 
exchange rate and current account balance over the business cycle.  An equivalent 
approach for New Zealand could be to target the structural operating balance; that is the 
operating budget balance adjusted for cyclical factors.  The structural balance could also 
be adjusted for the terms of trade.  The terms of trade has a significant influence on 
fluctuations in New Zealand GDP (Buckle, Kim, Kirkham, McLellan and Sharma, 2007).  
However, the link between the terms of trade and fiscal revenue is weaker than in, for 
example, Norway and Chile.  Furthermore, targeting a terms of trade-adjusted balance 
may be more difficult in New Zealand because the more diversified make-up of prices that 
determine New Zealand’s terms of trade may make decomposition of changes into 
structural or cyclical components more difficult. 
Limits on government expenditure growth, discussed in the previous section, is another 
approach that could be aimed at improving both sustainability and stability.  The aim of 
expenditure limits is to enhance fiscal sustainability by providing expenditure control.  This 
approach would also complement stability if the expenditure limit prevented pro-cyclical 
changes to expenditure.  Countries that set limits on the level of expenditure include 
Sweden, the Netherlands, the UK, Finland and the US.  This approach is similar to the 
provisions approach that operated in New Zealand.  As discussed earlier, the shortfalls of 
this approach were that it did not allow decision-makers to focus on the medium-term debt 
and operating balance impacts of their decisions, and it gave rise to arbitrary distinctions 
as to what did and did not count within the limit.  Had such a rule operated over recent  
WP 08/02 |  ROLES OF FISCAL POLICY IN NEW ZEALAND  36
 
years in New Zealand, it is questionable whether expenditure limits would have been 
politically sustainable in the face of frequent upward adjustments to the structural 
operating balance. 
A third approach could be to specify a rule which states that when realised fiscal cash 
balances are higher than forecast in the prior year, they will be allocated to increasing net 
public assets (the rule would also be applied on the down-side).  This type of rule has 
been suggested in New Zealand (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2007).  Because 
realised cash balances can differ from forecasts for a number of reasons, only some of 
which are related to the business cycle, this rule will best support macroeconomic stability 
when it is targeted.  It could, for example, specify that unexpectedly high realised cash 
balances that arise as a result of a larger than expected output gap will be allocated to 
public debt reduction.  This type of rule may also support sustainability if it helped avoid a 
tendency toward asymmetric treatment of unexpected changes to fiscal balances.  A 
number of countries have recently taken the approach of using windfalls to build assets or 
reduce liabilities.  For example, Australia used proceeds from the sale of Telstra to build 
the Future Fund.  Canada has a rule whereby unexpected increases in revenue will be 
used for debt reduction, although the rationale for the rule was essentially to reduce public 
debt. 
A more radical approach is the establishment of a fiscal stabilisation authority or ‘Fiscal 
Policy Committee’ with a small number of fiscal instruments chosen for their potency in 
influencing the business cycle (see for example Wren-Lewis, 2003; Wyplosz, 2005).  For 
example, Buiter (2006) suggests that for New Zealand a variable GST rate could be a 
suitable instrument.  The idea is that the authority would only be allowed to make 
temporary changes in these instruments in order to provide an additional instrument to 
support traditional monetary policy instruments.  Objections may, however, be raised that 
such approaches may be inconsistent with standing constitutional principles (such as the 
principle that taxation can only be imposed by Parliament) and may result in high 
compliance costs. 
5.4  Should structure be determined by stability concerns? 
Recent debate in New Zealand has also explored the linkages between fiscal structure 
and stability.  One area of interest has been whether the taxation structure and regulations 
applying to the housing market are exacerbating volatility of house prices and hence 
exacerbating excess demand pressures. 
The role of housing in the current business cycle was part of the motivation for a joint 
investigation by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Treasury to explore whether 
there are supplementary stabilisation instruments available which could be deployed to 
complement monetary policy and in particular “enable less reliance to be placed on the 
OCR and, hence reduce some of the pressure on the exchange rate” (Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand and the Treasury, 2006, paragraph 9, page 8).  Measures to slow house 
price appreciation were given particular consideration.  These issues continue to be 
considered by a Parliamentary Select Committee established to review the operation of 
monetary policy in New Zealand and were considered in a recent conference hosted by 
the Treasury and Reserve Bank of New Zealand in December 2007 (See Buckle and 
Drew, 2008). 
This recent experience has highlighted the issues associated with using discretionary 
fiscal and regulatory policy as instruments of stabilisation policy.  In particular, without  
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institutional solutions, fiscal or regulatory options have proven to suffer from 
implementation delays, have tended to raise issues of conflicts with other objectives, or 
have high costs when considered on micro-efficiency grounds.  They may also raise 
distributional concerns.  We discuss some of the options raised to highlight the 
institutional issues associated with fiscal policy. 
To illustrate the policy lags, a year out from undertaking this work and despite extensive 
debate, the only proposal that has been implemented by Government has been a 
provision made in the 2007 Budget of an additional $NZ14.6 million over the next three 
years to strengthen IRD’s auditing of property transactions. 
A proposal considered by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and Treasury (2006) is to 
ring-fence losses on investment properties.  This would remove the option available to 
property investors to use losses on rental property to offset tax liabilities from profits made 
elsewhere in their portfolio.  This proposal would treat property losses differently from 
other losses, as under the Income Tax Act all losses are currently able to be offset against 
any form of income.  In support of this exception it is argued that the degree of leverage 
available on rental properties, as opposed to other assets, provides a bias towards 
investing in property and hence has accentuated the property cycle. 
Another option considered was a Mortgage Interest Levy (MIL).  This is a discretionary 
levy on the interest rate applying to mortgages for residential properties, to be applied or 
removed at appropriate stages of the housing market cycle.  The attraction of this idea is 
that it would apply a wedge between the interest rates paid by domestic borrowers and 
those interest rates available to foreign lenders, thereby partially substituting for increases 
in the Official Cash Rate but with less effect on the exchange rate.  In addition to 
questions about effectiveness, this option illustrated the constitutional issues that would 
arise in devolving responsibility for fiscal policy to an independent authority.  Giving the 
Governor of the Reserve Bank, for example, the power to impose the levy may raise 
concerns that it would conflict with the long-standing general principle that taxation cannot 
be imposed without the explicit involvement of Parliament. 
One regulatory proposal that would seem to have merit on micro-efficiency grounds is the 
proposal to ease constraints on housing supply, including land supply.  Recent research 
indicates that the cost of land relative to the costs of house construction has been a 
significant cause of rising house prices in New Zealand over the last 25 years.  Grimes 
and Aitken (2006) find that house prices respond more strongly to demand shocks in New 
Zealand local authorities in which housing supply responsiveness is low compared with 
those in which supply responsiveness is high. However, changing these requirements 
takes time as they are set out in a multitude of council rules.  Further, freeing up land for 
more housing may conflict with other objectives such as limiting urban sprawl and current 
plans relating to infrastructure investment.  No changes have yet been made in this area.  
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6 Conclusions 
This paper has discussed how fiscal policy can support long-run growth through 
sustainability and structure and how it can best contribute to macroeconomic stability.  An 
aim of the paper is to understand the institutional structures which are likely to result in 
good decision-making in terms of each of these lenses. 
Sustainable public finances are important to ensure that the cost of financing government 
expenditure is minimised and to ensure that the financing of government expenditure does 
not impose large costs on the private sector through impacts on interest rates, exchange 
rates and inflation.  Political economy issues, such as the incentive of politicians to shift 
costs into the future, mean that sustainable fiscal policy will most likely be achieved 
through the use of fiscal rules and formal institutions.  The New Zealand framework is 
based on a set of legislated principles and transparency requirements.  Within this 
framework government specifies its objectives for fiscal aggregates over a 10-year 
horizon. 
This framework has been successful in delivering sustainable fiscal outcomes, at least 
over a medium term time-frame.  As evidence of this, New Zealand is one of the few 
countries in the world in a net public financial asset position.  Further, New Zealand has 
been in a position where operating surpluses in the current period can be used to pre-fund 
some of the future expected costs associated with population ageing.  However, despite 
this level of pre-funding, projections over a 40-year horizon show that a continuation of 
current policy settings or expenditure growth rates would result in a deterioration of the 
fiscal position over the longer term.  How much weight current policy decisions should 
place on these long-term projections is unclear and at present there does not appear to 
be a clear basis for making this type of assessment. 
Fiscal structure refers to the composition of government expenditure and taxation.  The 
development of endogenous growth models has identified several fiscal policy instruments 
that have the potential to influence long-run growth.  There is also a widely respected view 
that a low-rate broad-based tax system supports long-run growth, although as noted there 
may be times when departures from this principle can be justified.  Information 
constraints, particularly in relation to the net benefits of government expenditure initiatives, 
mean government faces significant challenges in exploiting the insights of endogenous 
growth models and in evaluating the full cost of policy initiatives, particularly the cost of 
financing.  This implies that the institutional framework for fiscal policy decisions is 
important. 
New Zealand has sought to overcome some of the information challenges through the 
devolution of decision making on expenditure to those with the most information, within a 
framework that specifies the objectives of policy and provides for accountability and 
monitoring.  However, challenges remain in ensuring that government expenditure is 
subject to scrutiny on a sound value-for-money basis and in achieving an efficient tax 
structure.  Two institutional solutions to this which have been discussed are the creation 
of rules specifying incentives to find low priority expenditure and the imposition of tight 
top-down revenue or spending constraints to force prioritisation. 
The role of fiscal policy in macroeconomic stability is less clear than for sustainability or 
structure.  The time-inconsistency problem implies that allocating the role of 
macroeconomic stability to political actors is not credible, and hence will not result in  
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stable outcomes.  For this reason, the Reserve Bank has been assigned the role of 
maintaining price stability within an institutional framework that is intended to ensure 
monetary policy is time-consistent. 
The question therefore arises as to the appropriate role of the fiscal authority within an 
inflation-targeting regime.  One view is that because, under normal circumstances, the 
Reserve Bank can be expected to maintain inflation and output at equilibrium levels, fiscal 
policy should have no regard to its impact on stability.  However, the counter argument is 
that fiscal policy still needs to take account of the costs imposed on the private sector 
arising from the effects of large changes in fiscal policy, undertaken for sustainability or 
structural reasons, on interest rates, the real exchange rate and output volatility.  Fiscal 
policy should take account of whether, for example, large discretionary changes are likely 
to result in significant crowding out of the private sector.  This may, however, result in 
some tension between short-term impacts and long-term objectives.  Somewhat more 
controversial is the debate about a more active stabilisation role for fiscal policy.  In 
principle, the instruments exist.  But the lesson of the past is that appropriate fiscal 
institutions need to be in place to ensure time-consistent policy.  The types of institutions 
proposed range from independent fiscal authorities with considerable discretion, to fiscal 
councils with a more advisory role. 
The framework for evaluating the roles of fiscal policy proposed in this paper therefore 
throws up a number of questions that warrant more extensive treatment, questions such 
as:  What is the appropriate time horizon over which to assess fiscal sustainability?  Could 
fiscal rules or other institutional rules improve fiscal structure?  Are structural policies 
exacerbating the macroeconomic stability objective?  Are there institutional solutions that 
would limit political discretion and would allow fiscal policy to play a more effective 
stabilisation role?  How much weight should be put on short-term macroeconomic impacts 
when government wants to progress policies which are intended to support long-run 
growth?  Precise answers to these questions may be elusive, but posing these questions 
should help direct priorities for future work on fiscal policy and for improving the design of 
the fiscal framework. 
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Tables 























1.  The PFA specifies the following principles of responsible fiscal management: 
¾  reduce debt to prudent levels so as to provide a buffer against factors which may 
impact adversely on debt in the future, by ensuring that, until those levels have 
been achieved, total operating expenses in each financial year are less than total 
operating revenues; 
 
¾  once prudent levels have been achieved, maintaining those levels by ensuring that, 
on average, over a reasonable period of time, total operating expenses do not 
exceed total operating revenues; 
 
¾  achieving and maintaining levels of total net worth that provide a buffer against 
factors which may impact on net worth in the future; 
 
¾  managing prudently the fiscal risks facing the Government; 
 
¾  pursuing policies which are consistent with maintaining a reasonable degree of 
predictability about the level and stability of taxation rates in the future. 
 
2.   Reporting requirements under the PFA include 
¾  The Government must publish a Budget Policy Statement before April each year 
setting out their priorities for the Budget and any changes in long-term objectives 
and short-term intentions (see below).  Recent Budgets have used a themes 
approach to prioritising government expenditure.  The 2007 Budget specified the 
themes to be “families, young and old”, “national identity” and “economic 
transformation”;   
 
¾  Treasury must produce an economic and fiscal update covering the current year 
and next two.  An update must be produced prior to 31 December, with each 
Budget and prior to an election.  Assumptions used in the update are those of the 
Treasury.  The fiscal update must include financial statements prepared under 
GAAP and a statement of specific fiscal risks – that is government decisions and 
explicit contingent liabilities.  Assumptions used in the update are those of the 
Treasury; 
 
¾  A statement on major tax policy changes must be published with each Budget.  This 
sets out the intended change and the cost of the policy; 
 
¾  Governments must publish with each Budget a Fiscal Strategy Report setting out 
short-term intentions for key fiscal variables over the next 3 years, long-term 
objectives for those variables and projections of those fiscal variables over a period 
of at least 10 years.  The FSR is the Minister’s document and hence projections are 
based on the Minister’s assumptions; 
 
¾  The Treasury is also required to make fiscal projections over a period of 40 years at 
least every 4 years 
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Table 2 - Employment in the public and private sectors 
(Filled jobs, June years 2000 and 2006) 
 
Filled jobs  Level (000s)  Change 
Years to June  2000  2006  (000s)  % per annum 
Total sectors  1,408,600 1,687,400  278,800  3.1 
Total private sector  1,144,100 1,381,100 237,000  3.2 
Total public sector 264,500  306,300  41,800  2.5 
 Public service  31,000 42,100  11,100  5.2 
Health services  48,000  56,400  8,400  2.7 
Education 106,500  106,000  -500  -0.1 
Other public sector 79,000  101,800  22,800  4.3 
Source: Statistics New Zealand. 
Note:  Public sector includes central government and local government.  Public service is central government. 
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Figures 
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Source: Treasury Fiscal Strategy Model (2007) 
Figure 2 - New Zealand gross sovereign issued debt and net public debt (actual   
and projected) 
 
Source: The Treasury Statement of Long Term Fiscal Position (2006)  
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Source: The Treasury (2006) 
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Source: The Treasury. 
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Figure 5 - New Zealand fiscal balance and fiscal impulse indicator 
 
Source: The Treasury (2007). 




















Source: The Treasury and Claus, Gill, Lee and McLellan (2006) updated by Treasury.  
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Figure 7 - Comparison of VAR-based and traditional measure of fiscal impulse to 
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Note:  The “VAR” measure is from Figure 6 and the “Indicator” measure is from Figure 5. 
Figure 8 - New Zealand government consumption and investment expenditure 
Source: Statistics New Zealand 
 